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The first chapter examines the effect of the number of years children spend living 
with a single-parent family instead of a two-parent family on children’s completed 
schooling, based on a sample of children from the PSID. To deal with the endogeneity of 
mothers’ family structure decisions, I exploit the variation across states and over time in 
unilateral divorce laws, unmarried fertility ratios, welfare rules, earned income tax credit 
rates, and labor market conditions that generate plausibly exogenous changes in mothers’ 
family structure choices. I construct a set of extensive measur s for these contextual 
variables and use them as instruments to estimate a child’s human capital production 
function. Instrumental variable estimation indicates that one additional year spent in a 
single-parent family during childhood (ages 0–15) can cause a loss of 0.145 years in 
schooling. This result implies that the differences in family structure experiences over the 
early life course between white and nonwhite children can explain roughly 76% of the 
gap in educational attainment between the two groups. On the other hand, ordinary least-
squares estimation only suggests 13%.  
Children born to unmarried parents may receive lower human capital investments 
in youth, and therefore may be less likely to finish high school or to attend college. The 
second chapter explores these effects empirically using state level data over the period 
1940-2000. We find that a steady-state increase in unmarried fertility rat o of 100 per 
1,000 child births could lead to a 4.6 percent drop in high school graduation rte and a 
steady-state 4.2 percent decline in secondary school enrollment in the long-run. This 
result is important since Heckman and Lafontain (2010) found that since the late 1960s 
 iii  
the high school graduation rate has fallen by 4-5 percentage points, despite the growing 
wage differentials between high school graduates and dropouts. Our analysis implies that 
the rise in unmarried fertility predicts a ceteris paribus drop in high school graduation rate 
of about 6.6% in the same time period, thus provides an important explanation for the 
dropout problem in recent decades.. Moreover, our results indicate a very weak link 
between abortion and child education, in contrast to the strong effect of abortion on crime 
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THE EFFECT OF FAMILY STRUCTURE ON CHILDREN’S EDUCATION: 
AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE APPROACH 
 
 
1. Introduction      
A large and growing literature has found a significant correlation between family 
structure and children’s development and future well-being. On average, children 
growing up in two-parent families tend to fare better than children growing up in other 
family types in terms of a large variety of outcomes, including improved cognitive, 
emotional, and physical well-being, better performance in school and labor market, and 
lower risk of teenage or nonmarital childbearing.1 However, it is difficult to interpret this 
large literature causally since family structure is not exogenously asigned but selected by 
parents. This paper asks whether children raised in a two-parent fmily would achieve 
better educational results compared to children raised in a single-parent family. This 
investigation is done using instrumental variables (IVs) to control fo  the endogeneity of 
family structures. 
Most earlier findings are based on simple correlation studies and fail to account 
for endogeneity or self-selection problems. The main limitations lie in the fact that family 
structure changes are not exogenous or random events independent of other determinants 
of children’s outcomes. There may be unobserved variables or processes that jointly 
determine family structure and children’s outcomes. To be more specific, two key 
sources of selection bias could arise: (1) Women who choose to marry or cohabitate with 
                                                
1Ginther and Pollak 2004; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Astone and McLanahan 1994; Fronstin, Greenberg, and 
Robins 2001; Cherlin, Kiernan, and Chase-Lansdale 1995. 
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a partner may be systematically different from women who choose to b single in both 
unobserved preferences and ability. (2) A child’s unobserved ability or schooling 
prospects may affect the mother’s marital decisions.  
To illustrate the first problem, suppose that mothers who are more child-oriented 
are more likely to exit low-quality marriage or to be more careful and patient in their 
search for a partner. Then, the estimated effect of living in single-parent families on child 
education will be upwardly biased. To illustrate the second problem, suppose that 
mothers with low ability are more likely to have low-ability children and are more likely 
to compensate their children by entering or staying in a marriage for a potential extra 
earner or caregiver. In this case, the estimated effect of single-motherhood on child 
education will also be biased upward. Therefore, both unobserved characteristics of 
mothers and children may influence mothers’ decisions on family structure. The presence 
of these unobserved characteristics makes it very difficult to estimate the effect of family 
structure decisions on children’s outcomes. 
To make things worse, measuring family structure correctly is very challenging 
given the recent rise of more complex family arrangements, such as cohabitation and 
stepfamilies. Due to the ambiguity of family boundaries associated with these family 
forms, reporting them is often inconsistent among family members and is dependent on 
the measurement strategies.2 If the measurement error of family structure is random, then 
the estimated effect of family structure on child outcomes would be biased toward 0.  
                                                
2See Brown and Manning (2009) for a recent review of the related studies. 
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To address the above-mentioned issues, this paper estimates the effect of family 
structure on child educational attainments by using IVs that are related to the mothers’ 
family structure decisions but otherwise unrelated to child outcomes. In particular, I 
examine the effect of the number of years a child spends living with a single-parent 
family from birth to age 15 on the child’s number of completed schooling years by the 
age of 25. My estimation is based on a sample of children from the Pan l Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) born between 1968 and 1982. I choose this sample since the 
childhood years of these children (1968–1997) witnessed major changes from the 
following four sources that may lead to plausibly exogenous variations in mothers’ 
family structure decisions: (1) unilateral divorce laws, which were adopted by most states 
during the 1970s and which increased the ease of divorce by not requiring the consent of 
both partners; (2) the sharp increase in unmarried fertility ratio (UFR) since the 1960s, 
which could imply a waning social stigma against single-motherhood; (3) Welfare 
Waivers between 1993 and 1996, and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), which replaced the Aid to Family with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996, 
imposing time limit and work requirement restrictions on welfare recipients; (4) Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), the expansions of which in 1986, 1991, 1994, and 1996 led to 
a larger marriage tax penalty. 
I construct an extensive set of measures for the state-level unilateral divorce 
regulations, UFRs, welfare rules, EITC rates, and local labor market conditions over the 
first 16 years of a child’s life, and I use them as instruments for the mother’s choices 
about family structures over the same childhood years in the estimation of the child’s 
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human capital production function. These variables turn out to be valid instruments and 
are reasonably powerful in explaining mothers’ marital behaviors. Moreover, the 
substantial variations in these contextual variables across stateand over time provide the 
basis for identification. 
One problem with an extensive list of IVs is that the two-stage least-squares 
(2SLS) estimates can be severely biased toward the probability limit of the corresponding 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates when there are many overidentifying instruments 
(see, e.g., Stock and Yogo 2004; Andrews and Stock 2006; and Hansen et al. 2008). To 
overcome this problem, I use the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) 
estimator, which is approximately unbiased for the overidentified model (see Flores-
Lagunes 2007 and Hansen et al. 2008). The 2SLS estimates lie between those of OLS and
LIML, implying that 2SLS does suffer from a strong bias toward OLS. Stock and Yogo 
proposed a test on whether such many-instrument (or weak-instrumen ) biases are 
tolerable compared to the OLS bias. The test suggests a strong bias for 2SLS but does not 
signal a bias problem for LIML. 
The main results indicate that living in a single-parent family has a significant and 
sizeable detrimental effect on children’s educational outcomes. In particular, one 
additional year spent in a single-parent family during childhood (ages 0–15) can cause 
the child to lose 0.145 years in schooling. This result is robust to a wide range of 
alternative sets of instruments. This is quite comforting since IV stimates are known to 
only estimate a local average treatment effect and are very sensitive to the instruments 
used. My findings also suggest a strong downward bias associated with OLS estimation. 
 5
Based on the PSID sample, the LIML estimate implies that the diff rences in family 
structure experiences over the early life course between white and nonwhite children can 
explain roughly 76% of the gap in educational attainment between the two groups, 
holding everything else equal. On the other hand, OLS suggests only 13%. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews alternative 
methods for dealing with the endogeneity problem. Section III presents the empirical 
model. Section IV describes the sources of the instruments. Sections V and VI present the 
results and conclusions, respectively. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature that examines the relationship between family structure and 
children’s well-being is extremely large. However, most studies scribe the correlation 
between child outcomes and family structures and suffer from the endog eity biases 
discussed above. Many studies acknowledge this problem, and some attemptto overcome 
it using the following methods.  
If the bias comes from omitted variables that are related to both family structure 
and children’s outcomes, the most straightforward approach is to add these omitted 
variables in the equation. However, it is difficult to identify all the omitted variables, let 
alone find good measures of these. In practice, researchers include umerous variables to 
serve as potential indirect control or proxy variables, among which family resources and 
background information are the most common. For example, McLanahan and Sanderfur 
(1994) showed that the difference in income accounts for as much as half of the 
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difference in school achievement between children from two-parent families and one-
parent families, and their finding holds across three US surveys (PSID, NLSY, and 
NSFH). Fronstin, Greenberg and Robins (2001) found similar results from UK data and 
recorded weaker effects of parental disruption on labor market performance for both 
males and females after controlling predisruption characteristics. Almost all such studies 
find a weaker linkage between family structure and child well-being as they add controls. 
However, to the extent that these extensive controls are imperfect approximations of the 
actual omitted variables, the results may still be biased. Moreover, this approach could 
not address biases from reversal causality (e.g., parents take their children’s future 
outcomes into consideration when making family structure choices). 
Sibling comparison could be used to control unobserved family-specific variables, 
but this control does not eliminate biases that come from other error structures. For 
example, the unobserved factors specific to each sibling within one family still cannot be 
accounted for. Using data from US and UK, respectively, both Sandefur and Wells 
(1999) and Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) indicated that sibling controls weaken the 
relationship between family structure and a child’s schooling but do not eliminate it. In 
comparison, based on an NLSY sibling sample from 1986 to 1994, the analysis of 
Ginther and Pollak (2003) shows no statistically significant link between schooling and 
family structure. Sibling analysis relies on the differences in the siblings’ childhood 
experiences in alternative family structures to explain the differences in their future 
outcomes. Families with relatively stable family arrangements (a majority of the families) 
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do not contribute much to this analysis. Moreover, sibling analysis cannot address the 
problems of reverse causality or measurement errors. 
Another approach would be to look for a natural experiment. While it is clearly 
not feasible to randomly assign households to different family types, Corak (2001) and 
Lang and Zagorsky (2001) used parental death as a quasi-natural experim nt for single 
parenthood. Both found that parental death has much less impact on children than 
parental absence because of divorce. Their studies suffer from tw ain problems. First, 
families that experienced parental death can be significantly different from families that 
did not. Numerous studies find a link between mortality, and marital quality.3 Second, the 
effect of parental deaths can be different from divorces or sepaations. For example, there 
are differences in the financial and social support that widowed and divorced single-
parent families receive. The distress and behavioral patterns of family members under 
each situation may also differ. Thus, it is difficult to find a feasible quasi-natural 
experiment situation where family structure changes are exogenous, and people who 
experience them are representative of the whole population.     
Very few studies have attempted to use IVs. Manski, Sandefur, McLanahan, and 
Powers (1992) evaluated alternative parametric and prior information assumptions in 
estimating the effect of family structure on high school completion. The standard probit 
model and the endogenous switching regression model generate very similar results, and 
both indicate that residing in a nonintact family at age 14 decreases the probability of 
graduating from high school. Both results also fall within the nonparamet ic bounds. So, 
                                                
3See Coyne et al. (2001) for example. 
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the authors concluded that there is little evidence to support the endogeneity of family 
structure. However, the instruments used in the endogenous switching regressions—the 
region indicators and parents’ educational differences—are questionable since it is 
difficult to rule out the possibility that these variables have dirct impact on children’ 
high school outcomes.4  
 
3. Empirical Methods 
The following human capital production function could be estimated to examine 
the impact of the family structure experience during childhood on the children’s 
educational attainment:  




              (1)  
where Hi represents the completed years of schooling for child i by age 25; M i 
measures the number of years child i spent in a single-parent f mily as opposed to a two-
parent family from birth through age 15; Ii is the average family income need ratio
5 f r 
child i also from birth to age 15 (the family income need ratio is a better measure than 
just the family income for economic resources accessible to child i since it is adjusted 
according to the family size and the needs of all family members6); Xi is a vector of 
observed family/child characteristics, including the mother’s education, the mother’s age 
                                                
4They also assume that the sex of children would not affect family structure. Dahl and Moretti (2008) showed that 
women with first-born daughters are less likely to marry and more likely to be divorced, and they also found that 
fathers are more likely to obtain custody of sons than daughters after a divorce.  
5The family income need ratio is computed by dividing the family income by the need standard specific for the family 
for a certain year. Both the family income and the ne d level are in 1983 dollars. Family income includes both taxable 
income (e.g., labor income and asset income) and transfer income. Need standard is Orshansky-type poverty threshold 
based on the annual food need standard with an additional adjustment for diseconomies of small households (in rent, 
etc.).  
6The estimation results are robust to alternative income measures, such as per capita family income. 
 9
at the child’s birth, number of children born to the mother, child i’s gender, birth order to 
the mother, birth weight, race, religion, and urban/rural factors; δa i  a dummy for child 
i’s birth year to control for the birth cohort fixed effect; ωi is child i’s unobserved ability 
endowment; 
	  is the mother's taste for child educational attainment; and 
	
 is the 
random error. 
Following the human capital literature, I made several assumptions in Equation 
(1). First, child educational attainment is determined by the cumulative experience of 
family arrangements and cumulative economic inputs. Second, family income measures 
could approximate for the economic inputs in child human capital developments. In 
addition, the time-invariant family/child characteristics, including the unobserved ability 
endowment, have a constant effect over time.  
The endogeneity problem arises because inputs M i and Ii may be correlated with 
the child’s unobserved ability ωi and the mother’s preference τi. To further clarify this 
problem, assume the mother’s reduced-form decision rule for family structures over child 
i’s childhood years (M i) to be  




         (2) 
where Ri is a set of contextual variables that form the state-level l gal, social, and 
economic environments that may influence the mother’s marital decisions from birth to 
age 15 of child i, including the cumulative measures over the same span of unilateral 
divorce laws, UFRs, welfare rules, EITC rates, and labor market conditions; 
 is the 
mother’s marriage preference; and 
 is a random error. 
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Child ability endowment ωi enters Equation (2) since the mother’s family 
structure decisions may be affected by the child’s ability. For example, mothers with low 
ability are more likely to have low-ability children and are more likely to compensate 
their children by entering or staying in a marriage for help from a potential x r  earner or 
caregiver. Mother’s preferences for child education 
	  may also influence family 
structure choices through her marriage preference 
. For example, mothers with the 
strongest preference for child education are more likely to exit low-quality marriage or to 
be more careful and patient in their search for a partner. Therefor, the estimated 
coefficient on family structure by OLS in Equation (1) is very likely to be inconsistent.  
 i enters Equation (2) for two reason. First, these family-formation-related 
contextual variables can directly influence a mother’s family structure choices. For 
example, unilateral divorce laws make divorce easier by not requiring consent from both 
partners. Second, since the mother’s decisions on family structure and labor supply are 
made jointly, any factors that affect her labor supply can indirectly influence marital 
decisions. Changes in transfer program policies as well as market demand conditions all 
have important effects on work decisions. 
R i can serve as valid instruments for M i in a child’s human capital production 
function (1), assuming that these contextual variables are uncorrelated with unobserved 
child ability endowment ωi and the mother’s preference for child outcomes τi in Equation 
(1). This exogeneity assumption seems plausible.  
The cumulative income Ii in Equation (1) is also potentially endogenous for two 
reasons. First, family income depends on the mother’s marital and work decisions, and so 
 11
it is potentially correlated with a child’s ability, which plays an important role in 
determining marital and work choices. Second, income depends on the mother’s ability 
endowment. To the extent that the mother’s ability is not fully captured by her observed 
characteristics, such as education, and that the residual part is co related with the child 
ability, this will also generate a potential correlation betwen income and unobserved 
child ability. Thus, I need to instrument for family income in Equation (1). Again, Ri 
could serve as a set of plausible instruments since these state-level contextual measures 
may have important effects on income, while at the same time they are not related to an 
individual child/mother’s ability.  
By using the set of variables in Ri as instruments, I can address the endogeneity 
issues associated with family structures and establish the causal link between family 
structure and a child’s educational outcomes by estimating the child’s uman capital 
production function (1).  
 
4.  Instrumental Variables 
To construct the instruments, I collect detailed information about the substantial 
changes in divorce law, UFRs, welfare rules, EITC rates, and l bor market conditions 
during the past few decades, which may be the main driving forces behind the changes in 
family structures. Table 1.1 presents the list of IVs used in this paper. In the following 
sections, I briefly outline the main relevant aspects of the sources for these instruments 
and discuss previous findings from the literature on each of them. 
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A. Unilateral Divorce Laws 
Under traditional state divorce regulations, divorce requires consent from both 
spouses. In the 1970s, to remove the high transaction costs and legal inefficiencies of the 
divorce process, there was a movement toward the unilateral divorce laws that allow 
divorce with the consent of either spouse.7 Most states enacted the laws in 1970s with 
five states even before 1970, while 17 other states never adopted the law. See the Table 
1.9 for more details. The dramatic change in divorce regulations across states in the 
1970s is accompanied with the sharp rise in divorce rates for the past few decades (see 
Friedberg 1998, Figure 1). It appears that, by making divorce easier, the enactment of 
unilateral divorce laws leads to higher divorce rates. 
Many studies have examined the effect of divorce laws on divorce rates. Peters 
(1998) argued that under the assumptions of symmetric information and no transaction 
costs, the change in law from mutual divorce to unilateral divorce would simply move the 
property rights from the spouse who wished to remain in the marriage to th  spouse who 
wished to leave, without making divorce more likely. To support her tory, she 
conducted a cross-sectional analysis based on a sample of women in 1979 and found no 
impact of the unilateral divorce. On the other hand, Allen (1992) used the sam cross-
sectional data but found a significant role of unilateral divorce on divorce. Friedberg 
(1998) revisited this question using state-level panel data from 1968 to 1988. By 
including state fixed effects and flexible state time trend controls, her study reveals a 
strong positive association between unilateral divorce and divorce rates. Based on 40 
                                                
7The other important feature of divorce laws reforms is the move to a no-fault divorce, which was already in place in 
many states before 1970. Since the change to no-fault divorce laws had little impact on divorce, it is not the focus of 
my discussion. 
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years of census data, Gruber (2004) confirmed that unilateral divorce regulations do 
significantly increase the incidence of divorce. Wolfers (2006) indicates that Friedberg 
(1998)’s analysis fails to “separate out preexisting trend from the dynamic effects of a 
policy shock” (p. 1802), and his modified estimation concludes that much of the effects 
arise soon after the change in divorce regulations, and the rise in divorce is reversed in 
the long run. 
Several studies examine the other impacts of unilateral divorce laws. Gruber 
(2004) provided some evidence for increased entry into marriage. He also found that 
children growing up in a unilateral divorce regime are less well educated, enjoy lower 
incomes, and are more likely to marry earlier. Alesina and Giuliano (2006) implied that 
women who plan to have a child are more willing to have the child within marriage as 
unilateral divorce regulations make it easier to escape marriage. 
To fully capture the dynamic effect of unilateral divorce laws on a child’s family 
structure experience during childhood years, I use as an instrument the to al number of 
years the child resides in a state with the laws in place from birth through age 15. The 
average childhood years exposed to a unilateral regime is slightly above 7 years with a 
standard deviation of 7.33. My findings indicate that exposure to a unilateral regime 
increase the number of years living in a single-parent family over childhood. 
 
B. Unmarried Fertility Ratio (UFR) 













UFR 000,1  
As shown in Figure 1.2, the national UFR grew slowly first and then started to 
rise rapidly after the 1960s. In addition to standard economic incentive-based models 
(e.g., welfare payments for unmarried mothers), there are also a host of more 
cultural/behavioral models claiming that the growth in out-of-wedlock childbearing may 
be associated with the decreased social stigma against single-motherhood. In general, 
stigma may serve as a substitute for legal restrictions on nonmarital childbirth (see Posner 
2000, Chapter 5). I argue that the UFR could be used as a proxy for the level of social 
norms against single parenthood. Also, UFR is much higher among nonwhites than 
whites, which corresponds to a stronger social disapproval of single motherhood among 
whites. 
Using panel data on state-level UFR by race,8 I constructed the average value of 
UFR for each child from birth to age 15, specific to the child’s birth year, race, and state 
of residence. My first-stage results indicated that this UFR measure has positive effects 
on the number of childhood years for a child to live with a single mother.   
 
C. AFDC, Waivers, and 1996 Welfare Reform 
Between January 1993 and August 1996, the Department of Health and Human 
Services approved welfare waivers in 43 states under Section 1115 of Title IV-A of the 
Social Security Act. These waivers can be considered the first phase of welfare reform; 
                                                
8UFR data are taken from Kendall and Tamura (2010).  
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many of the policies and concepts included in the state waiver requests were later 
incorporated into the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996. This comprehensive legislation changed the welfare system into 
one requiring work in exchange for time-limited assistance. It created the TANF 
program, which replaced AFDC. Under TANF, states and territories operate their own 
programs, so a great deal of heterogeneity in welfare rules acro s states has emerged. The 
main changes introduced by both Section 1115 Waivers and the 1996 welfare reform that 
are relevant to my analysis are time limits and work requirement rules.  
Time Limit: Under the AFDC rules, families were entitled to receive assistance 
for as long as they met the eligibility standards. Due to concerns that families were 
becoming dependent on AFDC and accepting welfare as a way of life, a number of states 
applied for and received waivers that allowed them to set time liits on welfare receipt. 
By the time AFDC was repealed, a total of 32 states had received waivers authorizing 
some form of time limits. Under TANF, all states could set th ir own time limits, though 
they are forbidden to use federal funds to provide assistance to a family that includes an 
adult who has received assistance for 60 months. A great deal of heterogen ity across 
states emerged as a result. For example, Florida and Georgia set the limits at 48 months, 
lower than the standard 60, while New York did not impose a time limit. See Table 1.10,9 
for more details about time limits. I construct three instruments to capture the effects of 
time limits, all of which are the average values over a child’s childhood years of the 
                                                
9Special thanks to Bernal and Keane (2011) for sharing with me their data on welfare rules shown in Appendix, Tables 
1.2–1.4. 
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following variables: a dummy for whether the state had a timel it, the length of the 
time limit, and years elapsed since the time limit was first implemented.  
Work Requirement: TANF provides that states must require adults to work after 
they have received assistance for 24 months, or earlier at state option. States differ greatly 
in their work requirements rules. In 1998, 21 states require welfare recipients to 
commence work immediately, and 24 states set a more generous work requirement time 
limit of 24 months. See Table 1.11 for more details about work requirement. Like benefit 
termination time limit, I construct three instruments to capture the effects of work 
requirement, all of which are the average values over a child’s childhood years of the 
following variables: a dummy for whether the state had a work requirement time limit; 
the length of the work requirement time limit; and years elapsed since the work 
requirement time limit was first implemented. 
AFDC/TANF Benefit Levels: AFDC/TANF benefit levels vary greatly across 
states and over time (see Table 1.12 for more details about benefit l v ls). To capture the 
effect of the benefit levels on the family structure experiences of children, I use the 
average value of the maximum real (in 1983 dollars) benefit levels for families with three 
children specific to the state a child grew up in and over the childhood period of the child.  
Three of the four stated goals of PRWORA involved reducing nonmarital bir hs 
and encouraging marriage. States that reduced out-of-wedlock childbear ng without 
raising abortion rates qualified for special bonuses. Changes in public assistance should 
have reduced the incentives to become a single mother and should have increased the 
incentives to marry. Time limits, sanctions, diversion activities, and work incentives all 
 17
make it harder to receive public assistance as a single mother wit out also engaging in 
work-related activities. 
Moffitt (1998) reviewed the extensive literature on the effect of welfare benefits 
on family behavior and concludes that there is evidence of a smallpositive effect of 
welfare on female headship, though this effect is sensitive to estimation specifications. 
Based on fertility and marital history records up to age 23 of the eight birth cohorts of 
women in the NLSY, Rosenzweig (1999) found that higher AFDC benefit levels and 
lower marital prospects induce young women to choose to have a child outsi e of 
marriage. Hoffman and Foster (2000) also confirmed the positive associ tion between 
welfare benefits and single-motherhood among disadvantaged young women. A more 
recent study by Light and Omori (2008) reveals that increased AFDC or TANF benefits 
are expected to decrease the likelihood of single-to-marriage tr nsitions but will increase 
the likelihood of single-to-cohabiting transitions. The authors also found that welfare 
benefits are positively associated with divorce for black women, but not for other groups.  
Recent findings on the effect of welfare reform are also mixed. Bitler et al. (2004) 
found that the transition from AFDC to TANF led to more marriages and less divorce, 
while Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004) found little effect of TANF on marriage rates. These 
conflicting results are consistent with the fact that TANF programs simultaneously 
encourage marriage by increasing eligibility for married women and discourage marriage 
by promoting female employment.  
 
D. The EITC 
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The EITC is a refundable federal income tax credit that supplements wages for 
low-income families. Since its inception in 1975, the EITC has undergon  major 
expansions in 1986, 1991, 1994, and 1996 and has grown into the largest federally 
funded means-tested cash assistance program in the United States. In addition, 15 states 
have enacted state EITC that supplements the federal credit by 2000. The EITC rate 
increases with the number of children in a family.10  
Hotz and Scholz (2003) provided evidence for marriage penalty associated with 
EITC, and this penalty has increased during the major expansions, especially from 1994 
to 1996. They argued that the effect of EITC on marital behavior mirrors that of 
AFDC/TANF benefits. Blau and Van der Klaauw (2011) found that the tax treatment of 
children affects family structure in a significant way. Several studies also found that the 
EITC expansions have different impacts on women’s labor supply depending on their 
marital status. Essia and Hoynes (2004) reported that that the expansions reduced total 
family labor supply of married women by just over a full percentage point. On the other 
hand, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) showed that the unprecedented increase in the 
employment and hours of single mothers during 1984-1996 can be largely attributed to 
the expansion of the EITC. To account for these effects, I construct the EITC phase-in 
rate using federal- and state-level EITC rules together. I use as instrument the average 
value over the childhood period of a child of the EITC rates for families with one child. 
            
5. PSID Data  
                                                
10For examples, in 2000, the subsidy rates for families with one and two-plus children were 34% and 40%, respectively.  
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The sample used in this paper comes from the 1968–2007 waves of the PSID. The 
PSID began in 1968 with about 5,000 households consisting of 18,000 individuals, which 
is a national representative sample with an oversample of low-income families. 
Information about families, individuals within the families, and direct descendants of the 
original families are collected annually from 1968 to 1997 and biennially after 1997.    
I confine my sample to children who were born after 1967 and who were prs nt 
for all waves until they reach the age of 25. I eliminate the group of children whose 
mothers were not in the household when they were growing up (age 0–15). This strategy 
creates a sample of 2004 children born between 1968 and 1982 who were presnt in 
every wave from the birth to age 25 and who grew up with their mothers in the house in 
all their childhood years.  
Information on their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as 
family compositions was collected on each interview date. Family income includes both 
taxable income (from wages, asset, investment, etc.) and welfare transfers from all family 
members. The income/need ratio will be used in my analysis to adjust family income for 
the family size, where need is the Orshansky-type poverty threshold based on annual food 
need standards, family size, and diseconomies of small households. Children’s 
educational outcomes are measured as the completed years of schooling by the age of 25.  
The 1985–2007 Marriage History File of PSID provides history of marriage, 
divorce, cohabitation, and separation as well as retrospective marriage histories for years 
before 1985 for all PSID individuals. By linking mothers’ marriage history information to 
the children sample, I was able to create the complete family structure experiences for 
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each child from birth to age 15. In particular, I compute the number of years a child spent 
living in a single-parent family (a mother-only family, to be more precise, since all 
children in the sample grew up with their mother always present in the family) during 
their childhood period. I include both marriage and cohabitation in the definition of two-
parent families, and I do not distinguish step-parent families from two-biological-parent 
families. 
PSID provides the residence state at each survey dates. This enables me to merge 
the PSID sample by state and year with the contextual variables, including divorce laws, 
UFRs, welfare rules, EITC rates, and labor market conditions describ d in Section IV. 
Then, I construct the set of IVs by taking the average of these variables over the age span 
of 0–15 of each child as measures of the different legal, social, policy, and economic 
environments that may have important effects on the mother’s family structure decisions 
over the child’s childhood years. One advantage of using the PSID sample is that the 
children from the sample grew up in 1968–1997, a period that witnessed most of the 
major changes in the contextual variables mentioned above.  
Figure 1.1 shows that the percent of children living in a single-parnt family 
increases with child age. Only 15.37% of the sample were born to a single-parent family, 
while 24% of these children lived with a single mother by the age of 15. 
Table 1.2 presents the main characteristics of the children and their mothers in the 
final sample. Of the 2004 children, 65% are white and 52% are female. The average 
completed years of schooling for children is 13.64, with the white children achieving 
higher educational attainment than the nonwhite (13.95 vs 13.06). The gap between white 
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children and nonwhite children are even more substantial in their family structure 
experiences and in the access to family income. Over the entirechildhood period (age 0–
15), a typical white child spent about 3 years in a single-parent family nd enjoyed an 
average of 0.91 for the log value of income/need ratio compared to 6.06 and 0.19 for her 
nonwhite counterpart.    
 
6. Results  
A. Reduced Form Regressions for the Endogenous Variables 
Table 1.3 presents the results of the first stage of 2SLS or the educed form 
regressions in LIML, which uses the instruments listed in Table 1.1, together with the 
exogenous variables in Equation (1) to predict the two endogenous variables: the number 
of years living in a single-parent family and the average income measures, both from 
birth to age 15. I suppress the exogenous variables listed in Table 1.2 to conserve on 
space.  
The upper panel of Table 1.3 shows reasonable coefficients on the instrumen al 
variables in general. For cumulative childhood family structure experiences (column 1), 
the following four instruments prove to be the most important predictors: the unilateral 
divorce laws, which significantly increase the number of years a child spends in a single-
parent family by making divorce easier; the UFRs, higher values of which imply lower 
level of social stigma against unwed mothers, thus leading to a positive effect; the 
welfare benefit levels, which turn out to have a negative effect; and the average state 
wage rate, which has a positive effect. The welfare reform rules (e.g., time limit and work 
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requirement) have no influence on mothers’ decision making except for a marginally 
significant negative effect from the years elapsed since the implementation of work 
requirements. This result is not surprising given the mixed findings from prior empirical 
work (see Section IV, Part C) and considering the fact that only a small fraction of 
mothers in the sample were affected by the welfare reform.11  
The bottom panel of Table 1.3 provides a summary table of some diagnostc 
statistics that are useful in identifying weak instruments. The partial R2 is the correlation 
between an endogenous variable and the excluded instruments after controlling for the 
exogenous variables, and Shea’s partial R2 further partials out the correlation of the 
endogenous variable with the fitted values of other endogenous variables. For the 
cumulative family structure experiences, these are 0.0243 and 0.0247, respectiv ly. The 
F-test is for the joint significance of the excluded instruments. This is 3.63 for family 
structure with a P-value of 0.0000. These statistics suggest that the ins ruments for family 
structure are reasonably powerful. See further evidence for this claim below.  
Now, I turn to the average income measure in column 2. The partial R2 and Shea’s 
partial R2 are 0.0395 and 0.0401, respectively, and the P-value for the F-test is 0.0000. 
Thus, the instruments also have reasonable influence on the average income. The 
regression results show that the most important IVs for income are UFRs, welfare benefit 
levels, time limit rules, and unemployment rates.  
 
B. Main Results 
                                                
11Only mothers of the 713 children born after 1977 were affected by the welfare reform toward the end of their 
children’s childhood years. 
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Table 1.4 reports the estimation results of Equation (1) from several m thods. The 
OLS estimation indicates a small but statistically significant negative effect of single-
parent family arrangements on children’s educational attainments. Spending one more 
year in a single-parent family instead of a two-parent family is associated with a loss of 
0.026 years of schooling. In contrast, the 2SLS estimate using the 12 instruments listed in 
Table 1.1 implies a much larger loss of 0.1284 years of schooling. However, as discussed 
in Section I, 2SLS can be severely biased toward the probability limit of the 
corresponding OLS with such a large set of instruments. I overcome this issue by using 
LIML, which produces an estimate of –0.1450 schooling years for each additional year 
spent with a single mother. I regard this as the preferred estimate since it is statistically 
significant at 5% and, moreover, almost unbiased, as I will discuss in the next part.  
The LIML estimation implies that spending one more year in a single-parent 
family can cause the child to lose 0.1450 years in completed education. This is a 
substantial effect. To view this more clearly, now I use the LIML estimate to examine 
how much the racial difference in family structures can explain the white-nonwhite gap 
in educational outcomes. An average white child in the sample spent 1.4 years in a 
mother-only family, while an average nonwhite child spent 6.06 years. Assuming the 
detrimental effect of nonintact family experiences to be constant across racial groups and 
holding everything else equal, this difference implies that the wite child will obtain 
0.6812 more years of schooling than her nonwhite counterpart, which can explain roughly 
                                                
12This is computed as 0.1450*(6.06-1.4). 
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76% of the actual gap in completed schooling (0.89)13 in my sample. In comparison, 
based on the OLS estimate (–0.026), an average white child would only obtain 0.12 more 
years of education than an average nonwhite, which can only account for 13% of the 
actual racial educational gap in the sample.  
Consistent with the literature, the OLS estimate of the correlation between family 
structure and education is quantitatively small when controlling for family income and 
background information. Once the instruments are used, the estimated negative effect of 
living in a single-parent family rather than a two-parent family on child education 
becomes about 4.5 times larger (–0.1450 vs –0.026), which implies a substantial upward 
bias for OLS. There are two possible explanations for this. As discussed in the 
Introduction, the endogeneity problem associated with mothers’ family structure choices 
can cause an upward bias when mothers who are more child-oriented or who have higher-
ability children are more likely to stay single. In addition, the increasing family structure 
measurement errors due to the rise of more complex family arrangements, such as 
cohabitation and stepfamilies, further bias the effect of family structure to 0.  
Table 1.4 also shows that the estimated effect of the average income falls by 26% 
(from 0.8179 to 0.6058) and becomes statistically insignificant when one uses the 
instruments. The LIML estimate suggests that the doubling average income would 
increase the finished schooling by (0.6058)*(ln2) = 0.41 years. In contrast, mothers’ 
education stays highly significant and quantitatively sizable. One mor  year of schooling 
for mothers can be translated to about 0.24 (LIML) more years of schooling for their 
                                                
13As shown in Table 1.2, on average, a typical white child will obtain 13.95 years of schooling by the age of 25, as 
compared to 13.06 for a nonwhite child. 
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children. In addition, column 4 shows that conditional on family background information 
(e.g., family structure, income, and mothers’ education), female children tend to achieve 
half-year more schooling than male children and that white children also tend to obtain 
about half-year less schooling.  
 
C. Comparison of Alternative Estimation Methods 
As discussed above, the bias in 2SLS toward the corresponding OLS increases 
with the number of overidenifying instruments. In comparison, the LIML estimator is 
approximately median-unbiased for overidentified models and provides a finite-sample 
bias reduction. Columns (1), (3), and (4) in Table 1.4 confirm this as the 2SLS estimate 
falls between OLS and LIML and is shifted about 16.4% of the way toward OLS.  
Stock and Yogo (2004) proposed a test for whether such many-instrument (or 
weak-instrument) biases are tolerable compared to the OLS bias. The weak-instrument 
test statistic was originally proposed by Cragg and Donald (1993), which is reported in 
the next to the last row in Table 1.4. Note that the test statistic is 3.998 for all IV 
estimations using the same 12 instruments (OLS, GMM, and LIML). Stock and Yogo 
developed the critical values for this test statistic for testing the null that instruments are 
weak, where weak instruments are those that can lead to an asymptotic relative bias 
greater than a certain percentage of OLS bias. The critical values for the null that the 
2SLS bias may exceed 20% and 10% of the OLS bias are 19.40 and 10.78, respectiv ly. 
Thus, we cannot even reject the null that the 2SLS bias may exceed 20%. In comparison, 
the Stock and Yogo critical value for the null that the LIML bias may exceed 10% of the 
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OLS bias is 3.58, which is smaller than the Cragg and Donald test statistic of 3.998. 
Thus, there is no evidence of serious bias associated with LIML estimators.  
An alternative way to solve the many-instrument bias problem is to reduce the 
number of instruments by using factor analysis. Four factors were obtained to summarize 
the information contained in the original 12 instruments using the princial factor method 
with varimax rotation. Column 5 in Table 1.4 presents the LIML results based on the four 
rotated factors. Using four instruments instead of the 12 instruments slightly increases the 
effect of family structure to –0.1559. The Cragg and Donald test statistic is 7.54, well 
above the 10% critical value of 4.72. However, the estimate with the reduced instrument 
set of four variables suffers from some efficiency loss and is only statistically significant 
at a 10% level. Thus, I do not adopt this as my preferred method. 
 
D. Robustness of the Results with Respect to the Instrument List 
Due to unobserved heterogeneity in treatment effects, IVs provide an estimate for 
a specific group—people whose behaviors can be manipulated by these IVs. Therefore, 
the IV estimates can be sensitive to the instruments used. Table 1.5 compares the LIML 
estimates using the original list of 12 instruments in column 1 and those using variants of 
the list in columns 2–6. The first stage results for the five variant instrument lists are not 
reported, but all five sets of instruments provide reasonable explanation of the 
independent variation of the two endogenous variables.14 
                                                
14The only exception is the IV set that consists of only unilateral divorce laws and unmarried fertility ratios (column 5 
of Table 1.5), which are not stronger predictors of family income.  
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In column 2 in Table 1.5, I remove all nine instruments related to welfare benefits 
and reforms (time limit and work requirement), and this decreases the estimated effect of 
spending one more year in a single-parent family to –0.1360 years of sch oling. In 
column 3, I exclude labor market variables, which also reduces the estimate slightly to –
0.1339. In column 4, I drop the two most powerful predictors of changes in family 
structure from the list: instruments specific to unilateral divorce laws and UFRs. The 
effect is very similar to column 1 but becomes marginally insignificant (P-value = 0.109). 
In comparison, column 5 uses only these two instruments, and the estimat  on family 
structure is very similar to that in column 4. However, the estimate on family income 
becomes highly insignificant, which can be explained by the two instruments’ weak 
explanation of family income (see footnote 14).  
In column 6, I add the interactions between mothers’ education and all welfare 
related instruments (i.e., welfare benefit levels, time limit, work requirement, and EITC) 
to the original instrument list. These new instruments allow the effects of welfare 
variables to vary with mothers’ educational level. Most coeffici nts on these interaction 
instruments have negative signs in the reduced form regressions on family structure, 
consistent with the notion that more educated mothers are less likely to use welfare. 
Adding these new instruments lead to a substantially smaller effect of family structure 
(from –0.1450 to –0.1151). 
To sum up, it is comforting to find that the effect of the number of years spent in a 
one-parent family instead of a two-parent family on children’s completed schooling is 
robust to alternative sets of instruments, with the estimated eff ct ranging from –0.1360 
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to –0.1465 (with only one exception of –0.1151). Moreover, all instrument sets passed 
the Hansen’s J/overidentification test reported in the next to the last row of Table 1.5.  
 
E. Other Future Child Outcomes 
Now we turn to other measures of children’s future outcomes.  Table 1.6 
estimates Equation (1) but use as the dependent variable the dummy variable indicating 
whether the child graduate high school by age 18. The results are very consistent with 
those in Table 1.4. The OLS estimation shows a small and marginally statistically 
significant negative effect of single-parent family arrangements on children’s probability 
of graduating high school. Spending one more year in a single-parent fmily instead of a 
two-parent family is associated with a loss of .36% probability of graduating from high 
school. In comparison, using the same 12 instruments listed in Table 1.1 LIML 
estimation implies a much larger loss of 4.55%. To put this number in perspective, a 
nonwhite child in my sample spent 4.66 more childhood years with a single parent than 
its white counterpart on average, which implies that an average nonwhite child would be 
about 21.2% less likely to graduate high school than an average white child due to family 
arrangement differences, ceteris paribus. The LIML estimation passed both week-
instrument and overidentification tests as shown on the last two rows of Column (2) of 
Table 1.6. 
Table 1.7 replicates all the estimations of Table 1.6 for the probability a child ever 
repeat a grade before age 18. While both OLS and LIML estimations imply no 
statistically significant association between family structure and probability of repeating 
 29
grades, it is worth noticing in LIML that one additional year of single-parent family 
experience may make a child 1.75% less likely to repeat a grade before 18.  
Table 1.8 focuses only on the female sample (1044 females with 665 white and 
379 nonwhite) to study the probability of having early childbirth before 19 as those girls 
grow up. Again, OLS estimation implies a small but statistically significant effect of 
growing up in a single-parent family on the probability of early childbirth. Spending one 
additional year in a single-mother family instead of a two-parent family is associated with 
0.89% increase in the probability of having childbirth before 19 in the future. The LIML 
implies a much stronger effect, 2.39% increase in the probability. However, it is 
statistically insignificant due to weak instruments (The LIML failed to pass the weak 
instrument tests) 
 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of the number of years a child spen s living with a 
single-parent family instead of a two-parent family on the child’s potential to complete 
schooling. This study is based on a sample of children from PSID born between 1968 and 
1982. To deal with the endogeneity of mothers’ family structure decisions, I take 
advantage of the variation across states and over time in unilateral divorce laws, UFRs, 
welfare rules, EITC rates, and labor market conditions that generat  plausibly exogenous 
variation in mothers’ family structure decisions. I construct an extensive set of variables 
for these legal, social, policy, and economic environment measures and use them as 
instruments to estimate a child’s human capital production function.  
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The main results indicate that living in a single-parent family has a significant and 
sizeable detrimental effect on children’s educational outcomes. In particular, one 
additional year spent in a single-parent family during childhood (ages 0–6) can cause the 
child to lose 0.145 years in completed schooling. This result is robust to a wide range of 
alternative sets of instruments. This is quite comforting since IV stimates are known to 
only estimate a local average treatment effect and are very sensitive to the instruments 
used.  
My findings also suggest a severe downward bias associated with OLS 
estimation. Based on the PSID sample, the LIML estimate implies that the differences in 
family structure experiences over the early life course between white and nonwhite 
children can explain roughly 76% of the gap in educational attainment between the two 
groups, holding everything else equal. In comparison, OLS suggests only 13%. There are 
two possible explanations for this. First, the endogeneity problem associ ted with 
mothers’ family structure choices can cause an upward bias if mothers who are more 
child-oriented or who have higher-ability children are more likely to stay single. Second, 
the increasing family structure measurement errors due to the rise of more complex 
family arrangements (such as cohabitation and stepfamilies) further bias the effect of 
family structure to 0. 
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Table 1.1.  Instrumental Variable List 
Notes: No. of observations: 2004. Time limit length equals 216 months (18 years) if the state does not have time limit. This also applies 
to work requirement time limit. 
Variables Description   Mean   SD 
Unilateral Divorce Laws 




   
UFRi Unmarried Fertility Ratio ( the average value over child age 0-15) 260.569  
(195.719) 
 
Welfare benefit & reform 
   
BENi 
Real AFDC/TANF maximum benefits for a family of four ( the average value over 




TL i No. of years living in a state with Time limit over child age 0-15 0.007  
(0.024) 
TL_LENGTHi Time limit length in months  (the average value over child age 0-15) 214.876  
(4.212) 
TL_ELAPSEDi 





WRi No. of years living in a state with work requirement over child age 0-15 0.009  
(0.031) 
WR_LENGTHi Work requirement time limit length in months  (the average value over child age 0-15) 214.174  
(6.234) 
WR_ELAPSEDi 
Years elapsed since the implementation of work requirement  (the average value over 






   
EITCi 






Local labor market 
   
UNEMPi Unemployment in the state (the average value over child age 0-15) 0.069  
(0.013) 
WAGEi 
Mean weekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing (the average value 
over child age 0-15)   
323.849   (85.283) 
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Table 1.2.  PSID Summary Statistics 
Notes: Variable “Child having childbirth before 19” is for female sample only: 665 white 








Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Child completed Education 13.64 (1.99) 13.95 (1.97) 13.06 (1.89) 
Child whether graduate HS  0.92 (0.26)  0.94 (0.23)  0.89 (0.31) 
Child ever repeat grade before 18  0.12 (0.32)  0.09 (0.29)  0.17 (0.38) 
Child having childbirth before 19  0.20 (0.40)  0.11 (0.31)  0.36 (0.48) 
 Years in a one-parent family 
Ages 0-15 3.02 (5.25) 1.40 (3.41) 6.06 (6.59) 
Birth 0.15 (0.36) 0.04 (0.19) 0.37 (0.48) 
Ages 1 to 5 0.83 (1.71) 0.32 (1.05) 1.79 (2.23) 
Ages 6 to 10 0.93 (1.83) 0.44 (1.30) 1.84 (2.29) 
Ages 11 to 15 1.10 (1.97) 0.60 (1.50) 2.06 (2.36) 
Ln (avg income/need ratio) 
Ages 0-15  0.66 (0.65) 0.91 (0.49) 0.19 (0.67) 
Birth 0.56 (0.72) 0.81 (0.57) 0.07 (0.70) 
Ages 1 to 5 0.63 (0.64) 0.86 (0.49) 0.19 (0.68) 
Ages 6 to 10 0.63 (0.71) 0.88 (0.55) 0.15 (0.75) 
Ages 11 to 15 0.65 (0.78) 0.92 (0.62) 0.14 (0.80) 
Mother's Education 12.93 (2.13) 13.31 (2.05) 12.20 (2.10) 
Mother's # of Children 3.17 (1.66) 2.86 (1.22) 3.76 (2.16) 
Mother's age at birth 24.55 (5.27) 25.16 (4.97) 23.40 (5.61) 
Whether first child 0.40 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48) 
Low birth weight 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.23) 0.09 (0.29) 
Birth year 1974.81 (4.29) 1974.97 (4.18) 1974.51 (4.46) 
White 0.65 (0.48) 
Female 0.52 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 
Urban 0.51 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.64 (0.48) 
Religion 0.99 (0.12) 0.98 (0.13) 0.99 (0.08) 
No. of observations   2004   1309   695 
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Table 1.3. Reduced Form Regressions for the Endogenous Variables 
           Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, **  p < 0.50, ***  p < 0.01. All exogenous 
variables in equation (1) – see Table  2- are suppressed to conserve on space.
  
Years in a one-parent family Ln(avg income need ratio) 
  
UNI i 0.0356** 0.0012 
 
(0.0159) (0.0016) 
   UFRi 0.0079** -0.0008*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0002) 
   BENi -0.0023* 0.0005*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0001) 
   TL i -13.6599 -11.5891** 
 
(46.6665) (5.0830) 
   TL_LENGTHi -0.0775 -0.0671** 
 
(0.2787) (0.0311) 
   TL_ELAPSEDi -2.3871 -0.7661 
 
(11.5880) (1.2610) 
   WRi 7.3001 8.5183 
 
(74.7334) (8.0166) 
   WR_LENGTHi -0.0960 0.0531 
 
(0.3748) (0.0400) 
   WR_ELAPSEDi -10.4030 1.0805 
 
(6.6636) (0.7182) 
   EITCi 45.5581 -2.1633 
 
(42.0647) (4.4562) 
   UNEMPi 5.0923 -2.2450** 
 
(10.1813) (0.9899) 
   WAGEi 0.0106*** -0.0004 
(0.0032) (0.0003) 
  N 2004 2004 
R2  0.2602 0.5494 
Partial R2  0.0243 0.0395 
Shea's Partial R2 0.0247 0.0401 
F-statistics 3.6300 6.5000 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 1.4. Comparison of Results by Estimation Methods 
Notes: The dependent variable is the completed schooling years by the age of 25. In columns 2-5, instrumental variables 




    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
    OLS   GMM   2SLS   LIML   LIML_Factor 
One-parent family years for 
ages 0-15 
-0.0249*** -0.1100* -0.1253** -0.1450** -0.1559* 
(0.0092) (0.0600) (0.0607) (0.0729) (0.0808) 
Ln(avg income/need ratio) for 
ages 0-15 
0.8179*** 0.6429 0.6414 0.6058 0.8469 
(0.0923) (0.4806) (0.4905) (0.5496) (0.5774) 
Mother's Education 0.2262*** 0.2424*** 0.2397*** 0.2424*** 0.2234*** 
(0.0226) (0.0425) (0.0431) (0.0473) (0.0494) 
White -0.1454 -0.3953 -0.4663 -0.5286 -0.6814 
(0.0967) (0.2656) (0.2695) (0.3096) (0.3562) 
Female 0.4748*** 0.4999*** 0.4961*** 0.5003*** 0.5057*** 
(0.0778) (0.0797) (0.0804) (0.0818) (0.0832) 
N 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
R2 0.2598 0.2269 0.2134 0.1935 0.1674 
Weak/many-instrument test  3.998 3.998 3.998 7.54 
P-value, Hansen’s J-statistics       0.6262   0.6262   0.6428   0.5662 
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Table 1.5. Robustness with Respect to the Instrument List 
Notes: The dependent variable is the completed schooling years by the age of 25.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, **  p < 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Original set Excludes 
Welfare 






























 (0.0729) (0.0683) (0.0868) (0.0900) (0.0912) (0.0736) 
       












 (0.5496) (0.7663) (0.5495) (0.5883) (0.9563) (0.5112) 
       
Mother’s education 0.2424***  0.2377***  0.2581***  0.2248***  0.3006***  0.2276***  
 (0.0473) (0.0631) (0.0470) (0.0506) (0.0768) (0.0451) 
N 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
R2 0.1935 0.2014 0.2097 0.1837 0.1906 0.2178 
Weak/many-instrument test 3.998 6.177 3.065 3.229 9.20 2.85 
P-value, Hansen’s J-statistics 0.64 0.52 0.67 0.58 - 0.55 
No. Instruments 12 5 10 10 2 19 
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 (1) (2) 
 OLS LIML 
One-parent family years for ages 0-15 -0.0036* -0.0455** 
 (0.0017) (0.0166) 
   
Ln(avg income/need ratio) for ages 0-15 0.0641*** 0.0545 
 (0.0158) (0.1111) 
   
Mother's Education 0.0119*** 0.0125 
 (0.0035) (0.0093) 
   
White -0.0381* -0.2007** 
 (0.0148) (0.0658) 
   
Female 0.0189 0.0285 
 (0.0115) (0.0147) 
   
N 2004 2004 
r2 0.0842 0.4268 
Weak/many-instrument test   3.688 
P-value, Hansen’s J-statistics  0.2385 
   
Notes:  Standard errors are in parenthesis.   
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 (1) (2) 
 OLS LIML 
One-parent family years for ages 0-15 0.0008 -0.0175 
 (0.0020) (0.0125) 
   
Ln(avg income/need ratio) for ages 0-15 -0.1018***  -0.2476**  
 (0.0184) (0.0919) 
   
Mother's Education -0.0111**  0.0003 
 (0.0040) (0.0079) 
   
White -0.0084 -0.0153 
 (0.0190) (0.0520) 
   
Female -0.0679***  -0.0654***  
 (0.0141) (0.0146) 
   
N 2004 2004 
r2 0.0828 0.1397 
Weak/many-instrument test   3.688 
P-value, Hansen’s J-statistics  0.3877 
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 (1) (2) 
 OLS LIML 
One-parent family years for ages 0-15 0.0089**  0.0239 
 (0.0031) (0.0353) 
   
Ln(avg income/need ratio) for ages 0-15 -0.0453 0.2228 
 (0.0301) (0.2378) 
   
Mother's Education -0.0170**  -0.0388* 
 (0.0062) (0.0194) 
   
White -0.1117***  -0.1713 
 (0.0320) (0.0931) 
   
N 1044 1044 
r2 0.1983  0.1269 
Weak/many-instrument test   2.180 
P-value, Hansen’s J-statistics  13.579 
   
Notes:  Standard errors are in parenthesis.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
UNMARRIED FERTILITY, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STIGMA 
 
1. Introduction 
Nonmarital childbirth has increased substantially over the past half century: the 
percentage of births to unmarried women rose from 3.8% in 1940 to 33.2% in 2000 
(Martin et al, 2002). Great concerns have been raised in social science about the adverse 
consequences of out-of-wedlock childbirth for children’s development and well-being. In 
this paper, we focus on the long-run relationship of unmarried fertility and children’s 
education. Using state-level data from the United States between 1940 and 2000, we find 
that a steady-state increase of 100 nonmarital births per 1,000 live births is associated 
with a decrease in high school graduation rates of 4.6 percentage points. This result is 
important since Heckman and Lafontain (2010) find that since the late 1960s the high 
school graduation rate has fallen by 4-5 percentage points, despite the growing wage 
differentials between high school graduates and dropouts. Our analysis shows that the 
rise in unmarried fertility predicts a ceteris paribus drop in high school graduation rate of 
about 7.1% between 1965 and 2000. In reality, the national high school graduation rate in 
our sample drops from 80.15% to 69.76%, a roughly 10% decrease. Therefore, our 
estimated effects of unmarried fertility can explain about 68% of decline in high school 
graduation in recent decades.   
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This paper is a natural extension of Kendall and Tamura (2010). Their papr used 
the same illegitimacy date starting in 1923,15 and found that states with higher unmarried 
fertility rates have higher crime rates in the future. Instead of focusing on crime, we 
examine the other aspect of the unfavorable outcomes of unmarried fet lity for children: 
the decline of their educational attainment. Based on state-level data on high school 
graduation rates, secondary and higher education enrollment rates, we find that children 
born out-of-wedlock may also receive less education. If there is cau al link between 
education and crime, this paper presents an important channel through which unmarried 
fertility poses an impact on future crime. Lochner and Moretti (2004) provide evidence 
that schooling significantly reduces the probability of incarceration and arrest by using 
compulsory schooling laws as instruments for education. 
The social stigma attached to nonmarital fertility wanes greatly during our sample 
period from 1940 to 2000. The long time series data allows us to examine the change of 
the relationship between out-of-wedlock childbirth and children’s future education over 
time, and thus reveal whether the degree of social stigma would affect this relationship.16 
In theory, the change in social norms is associated with the variation n parental match 
quality of the marginal out-of-wedlock childbirth. In particular, when the social stigma is 
high, only the lowest quality matches fail to marry – ones in which children may not have 
been much better off, or possibly even worse off, had their parents married. When unwed 
                                                
15 Kendall and Tamura (2010) used a different lag structure to calculate the effective unmarried fertility ratios for crime.  
16 In general, stigma and similar social norms may serve as a substitute for legal restrictions on non-marital childbirth 
(see the discussion in Posner, 2000, chapter 5).  Our findings illustrate how the level of social stigma in a society can 
change the outcomes of formal laws and policies regarding marriage and childbirth. 
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childbearing is more culturally acceptable, many high match quality marriages that would 
have benefited the children are foregone.  
Kendall and Tamura (2010) provide some evidence for the theory in termsof 
child crime outcomes. They find that some marriages in the 1940s and 50s were of such 
low quality that the children involved would have been less likely to commit a crime in 
the future in single-parent households. This finding is reversed in the 1960s and 
thereafter. However, our results show that the correlation between unmarried fertility and 
children’s educational outcomes remains negative for all these periods, implying that 
when it comes to education, even the worse matched marriage in the 1940s could benefit 
the children. 
There exists an extensive literature showing that children born out-of-wedlock 
fare worse than children growing up in two-parent families on a range of outcome 
measures17. However, little attention was paid to the long-run effect on children’s 
schooling achievement. While the individual-level data used in many of previous studies 
is highly important for some purposes, our state-level data allows us to analyze the 
general effect of unmarried fertility on the overall high school graduation rate18, to 
examine this effect over a longer time period, and to control fully or the effects of 
abortion.19 We are also able to examine why and how this effect has changed over time. 
Nevertheless, our results are generally consistent with this literatur .  
                                                
17 Baldwin et al. 1980; Card 1981; Haveman et al. 1997; Kahn et al. 1992; Mclanahan et al. 1994; Moore et al. 1997. 
Also see Waldfogel, Craigie, and Brooks-Gumm 2010 for a recent review. 
18 As well as secondary and higher education enrollment rates, respectively. 
19 See part 2 in section II. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory and 
model. Section 3 described the data and empirical methods. Section 4 presents our main 
results, and Section 5 Concludes. 
 
2. Theory 
A. Unmarried Fertility 












UFR 000,1  
As shown in Figure 2.121, the national UFR rose slowly until the early 1960s, then 
increased rapidly after.  The cause-in-fact of any change in the UFR must be either: (a) a 
change in the population share of unmarried women; or (b) a change in th fertility of 
unmarried women relative to married women.  There seems to be some evidence for both, 
as may be expected given the large increases visible in Figure 2.1.22 Proximate causes 
for increases in the unmarried fertility ratio are many and controversial, including 
important government policies such as welfare payments for unmarried mothers and child 
support laws.23  Our findings show that the social value of policies that affect marriage 
and childbirth incentives may depend on the level of social stigma prevalent in society. 
                                                
20 An alternative measure of unmarried fertility is the birth rate for unmarried women, ages 15-44.  However, this latter 
measure is not generally available for subnational regions over long time series, and, moreover, UFR is thought to be 
more relevant for the social consequences of unmarried fertility (Cutright and Smith, 1988). 
21 National UFR are weighted average based on 32 states for which data on mother’s marital status are avail ble with 
relatively little interpolation. See Appendix for details.  
22 Gray, et al, (2006) show that the population share of unmarried women has increased significantly, while Smith, et al. 
(1996) find an increase in unmarried fertility, and Ventura and Bachrach (2000) cite declines in birth ra es for marrieds 
and increases in intercourse frequency among unmarrieds. 
23 There is a substantial literature.  Some proximate c uses that have been suggested include: lower returns from 
specialization in marriage (Becker, 1981); the legalization of abortion (as discussed in the following subsection) 
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Children born to unmarried parents may receive lower human capital investments, 
because the partnership between the parents is less stable, and sometimes nonexistent 
(Becker, 1981). Rather than spend most or all of their childhood living with t o 
biological parents, children born to an unmarried couple may live in a variety of 
nontraditional circumstances. Among other possibilities, she may be raised by: a single 
parent alone; both parents, who married shortly after the birth; both parents, who 
cohabitate without marrying; one parent, married or cohabitating w th a step-parent; one 
parent and a grandparent, or any combination of these at different times during youth. 
The literature on the relationship between family structure and child outcome is 
astonishingly vast. Most research suggest that children growing up in nontraditional 
family arrangement tend to fare worse in a large number of dimensions both during their 
childhood ai-nd when they reach adulthood, relative to children raised up in a two-parent 
family.24 This paper mainly focuses on the educational outcome for children born to 
unmarried parents. 
Some research has noted that outcomes attributable to incomplete family structure 
may also be caused by other economic and social factors, which themselv s may affect 
family structure. The factor that attracts most attention is poverty.25 McLanahan and 
Sandefur (1994) found that about half the disadvantage associated with growing up in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Akerlof, et al, 1996); changes in racial compositin (Korenman et al, 2006); changes in social norms regarding 
premarital sex (Nechyba, 2001); generosity of welfar  programs towards unmarried women (Ellwood and Bane, 1994); 
loosening of child support rules (Aizer and McLanahan, 2006); increases in male unemployment and imprisonment 
rates (Wilson, 1987); and declines in religiosity (Berggren, 1997); economic “despair” caused by income inequality for 
low socioeconomic status women (Keaeney et al, 2011). 
24 Ginther and Pollak 2003; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Astone and McLanahan 1994; Fronstin, Greenberg and 
Robins 2001; Cherlin, Kiernan, and Chase-Lansdale 1995. 
25 Maternal education is another important factor. Ellwood and Jencks (2004) shows that since 1965 nonmarital 
childbearing rose far more rapidly among the less educated, leads to a rising correlation between a mother’s marital 
status and her education. 
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single-parent family was explained by the income difference. Ellwood and Jencks (2004) 
show that unmarried childbirth is three times more common among poor w men as 
among affluent women. Given the limitation inherent in our data, we cannot fully rule out 
the possibility that poverty, among other possible factors driving the unmarried fertility, 
may be the root cause of educational failure.26  However, the appropriate policy 
recommendation that can be derived from our findings – whether to targetunmarried 
fertility directly or some more primitive factors that cause it – is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
This paper also examines whether the social stigma associated with unmarried 
motherhood can change the effects of unmarried childbirth on children’s future 
educational achievement. The theory is described below. 
Our model is a variant of Kendall and Tamura (2010). Assume individuals live 
two periods. In the first period, pregnancy happens to a unit measure of parents, and these 
parents then decide whether to marry. In the second period, children bo n in the first 
period are adults. Since we are interested in the relationship between out-of-wedlock 
childbirth and future human capital investments, we ignore parents who are married 
before pregnancy. For simplicity, we also assume that each parental match has only one 
child. We can show that relaxing this restriction would not change the results.  
Parents care about their marriage quality and their children’s future human 
capital. We define a parent’s utility function as:  
),( HZUU =  
                                                
26 Moreover the state-level correlation between the poverty rate and UFR is only 0.20.  In a regression with fixed state 
and year effects, the estimated effect of poverty on UFR is not statistically significant, even at the10% level. 
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where Z is household output and H represents children’s human capital. For the 
purposes of our analysis, we define H as the possibility that a child succeeds in 
graduating from high school27; thus, U is strictly increasing in both arguments. 
Let a parent’s household output be increasing in their marriage quality, if they are 











where m ∈[0,1] denotes parental match quality, g is an increasing function in m, q 
denotes utility from being single, and s denotes utility loss from social stigma associated 
with single parenthood. 
 Let the probability H that a child succeeds to graduate high school be 










with f as an increasing function, implying that higher match quality allows for 
greater human capital investments in children. Given h > 0, having married parents 
increases the probability of graduating high school for all children bor  to parents of 
match quality )(* 1 hfmm −=> . Thus, children born to parents of very low match quality 
( )(* 1 hfmm −=< ) may be worse off if their parents marry, since low match quality 
                                                
27 For the estimation of effects on college enrollment rate, we can denote H as the possibility of a child attending 
college.  
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parents may fight often, be substance-abusers, or otherwise be unreliable in rearing 
children.28 Therefore, parents of match quality m will marry if and only if 
]1[),())(),(( hsqUmfmgU −≥      
Note that U is a strictly increasing function in m. Denote the match quality m for 
which equation [1] binds as m . Then all matches m ≥  m  will marry in the first period. 
First consider the simplest case, in which match quality is uniformly distributed 
among parents. In this case, the number of non-marital births is simply m .29 Then given 
the definition of the probability of graduating high school, H, high school graduation rate 




H hm f m dm= + ∫ .       [2] 
Then the change in period 2 high school graduation rate associated with an 







. This expression is 
positive if m  < m*, and negative if m  > m* (recall that )(* 1 hfm −=  ). Thus, for low 
levels of unmarried fertility (m  < m*), high school graduation rate is increasing in 
unmarried births. This is so because these children’s parents are of such low match 
                                                
28 It is possible that m* ≤ 0, in which case no matter how poor the match quality is, children are better off with married 
parents. 
29 Note that m  is not the UFR; all of the parents in our model conceive before deci ing whether to marry, but 
obviously many other parents are already married at the ime of conception. Nevertheless, under weak assumptions, 
UFR would be monotonic in m . 
30 Like m , the high school graduation rate here is only the rat  among children who are born to unmarried parents. 
Nevertheless, under weak assumptions, the real high school graduation rate we intend to estimate would be monotonic 
in the rate here. 
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quality that they are actually better off if their parents do not marry. In general, the effect 
of unmarried fertility on high school graduation rate is concave, see Figure 2.3. 31 
Now suppose that the social stigma associated with unmarried parenthood, s, 
varies between locations over some reasonably small interval, ],[ ss . From equation [1], 
it can be seen that m  will differ across locations, depending on the value of s. Therefore, 
denote the number of out-of-wedlock childbirths in a location with social stigma s as 
)(sm . Comparative statics then implies that locations with greater social stigma will have 




U g U fs
Z m H m
∂ − ∂ ∂= < ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂  +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
. 
Then if social stigma in all locations is high, such that *)( msm < , cross-sectional 
comparisons will show that locations with more unmarried fertility in period 1 have 
higher graduation rates in period 2. On the other hand, if social stigma is quite low across 
most locations – say if *)( msm >  – then cross-sectional comparisons will show that 
locations with more unmarried fertility in period 1 have lower graduation rates in period 
2. In general, as social stigma falls globally over time, the cross-sectional relationship 
between unmarried fertility and education will grow more negative. It can also be shown 
that this pattern is evident even if the assumptions f one child per couple and uniformly 
distributed match quality are relaxed. 
                                                
31 2









The theory implies that, if the social stigma declines over time, the relationship 
between unmarried fertility and education should be more negative in more recent years 
than in earlier years. If the social stigma is weaker among nonwhites than among whites, 
we should observe a stronger negative effect of unwed childbirth on children’s 
educational achievements among nonwhites. 
 
B. Abortion 
Legalized abortion provides a powerful birth control ool which enables women to 
eliminate unwanted pregnancies and to optimize the timing of childbearing, thus may 
create a more favorable environment for children’s development. Levine et al. (1999) 
finds that teenagers, unmarried women and economically disadvantaged are all more 
likely to seek abortions. Gruber et al. (1999) document that the children on the margin of 
abortion suffer difficulties in many dimensions in early childhood: infant mortality, 
poverty, and single-parenthood. The children from unwanted pregnancy, had they been 
born, would have likely grown up in an environment u likely to foster robust human 
capital investment, thus having low schooling achievement.   
However, there are two important biases in identifying such an effect empirically, 
one measurement-based and one structural.  The measurement issue relates to the fact 
that it is actually “wantedness”, not abortion, that influences children’s well-being. If 
parents use abortion as a way of reducing unwantedness, then abortion will increase 
children’s educational attainment; however, abortion is also a substitute for other forms 
of birth control, such as prophylactics and abstention.  Therefore, some variation in the 
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number of abortions may simply signify variation in the use of substitute birth control 
methods, in which case lower levels of abortion will actually correlate with less 
unwantedness, and therefore, higher educational attainment.32  Therefore, to find the true 
effect of a policy change that liberalizes abortion, looking directly at a measure of 
unwantedness, such as the unmarried fertility ratio, may be more appropriate.33 
Analyzing abortion in concert with unmarried fertility also addresses an important 
structural issue, first raised by Akerlof, et al. (1996). They proposed that the 
technological shock of abortion and female contraception may have played a major role 
in the rise of unmarried fertility in the later 20th century. They argue that legalizing 
abortion made unmarried women more willing to participate in uncommitted, premarital 
sex by reducing the cost of sexual activity. Even women who were opposed to abortions 
engage in more premarital sex to compete for boyfriends. When such women became 
pregnant, however, they could no longer rely on social pressure to ensurethat their boyfriend 
married them. Nonmarital births therefore rose. This means that abor ion legalization may 
increase the rate of unmarried fertility. As evidence for this effect, Ventura and Bachrach 
(2000) report national survey evidence that about 78% of out-of-wedlock pregnancies 
were unwanted in 1994, long after the legalization of abortion. If unwantedness is 
negatively associated with children’s educational outc mes, then abortion may lead to 
lower levels of educational achievement.  
                                                
32 In other words, it is difficult to distinguish shifts in the demand curve for abortions from movements along the 
demand curve.   
33 On the other hand, as discussed above, UFR may be  function of stigma, government policies, and other incentives 
facing parents, so it is not a perfect measure of unwantedness either.  At the least, however, our analysis complements 
abortion-based analyses. 
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We expect to find empirically that, after controlling for unmarried fertility, the 
effect of abortion to benefit children’s educational attainment should be stronger. This is 
because the effect of abortion on education, conditional on contemporaneous unmarried 
fertility, is estimated primarily through variation i  unwanted or mistimed pregnancies in 
married households, untempered by abortion’s potential for causing increase in 
unwantedness. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methods 
We use three different measures for children’s educational achievements: high 
school graduation rate, secondary school enrollment rate and higher education enrollment 





number of high school graduates






This measure is same to the national 17-year old gra uation ratio published by the 
National Center of Educational Statistics (NCES), 34 which is computed by dividing the 
sum of public and private high school graduate numbers by the size of 17-year-old 
population in each year. Following NCES and also previous literature,35 we exclude GED 
recipients and only count those who receive high school graduate diploma as high school 
graduates. One problem arises in that state-level data on private high school graduate 
numbers are only available for a limited number of years (see Appendix for more details). 
                                                
34 The only difference is that we construct this ratio for each of the state rather than for the nation as a whole. 
35 Cameron and Heckman (1993) and Heckman and LaFontaine (2006, 2008) find that GED recipients performs 
significantly worse than high school graduates in almost all dimensions, and are more equivalent to high school 
dropouts in terms of economic and social outcomes. 
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To solve this problem, we use available data on private high school enrollment, public 
high school enrollment and public high school graduate numbers to generate estimated 
values for private high school graduate numbers for the missing years. Removing those 
missing years, however, does not change our main results. Another problem is that 
population were reported in 5-year categories for state , thus we use the 15- to 19-year-
old population to construct 17-year-old population. Nonetheless, the national ratios 
calculated as the weighted average of all states from our data shows a generally similar 
trend as reported by NCES (see Figure 2.4).  
Another popular measure, often referred to as high sc ool completion rate, 
quantifies the proportion of freshmen high school students who receive a high school 
diploma four years later. We did not adopt this method due to the scarcity of grade-level 
enrollment data for earlier years. Reassuringly, the estimation based on state-level high 
school completion data from Warren (2005) for the more recent period 1975-2000 
generates similar results to those from our data for the same time period. Moreover, the 
national trend from Warren (2005) also matches oursmo t of the time (see Figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.4 shows that in US, high school graduation rate increases from 1940, 
peaks in 1965 at about 80 %, and then starts to fall. In 2000, the national rate is roughly 
70%, a nearly 10% drop from 1965, which is surprising given the growing wage 
differentials between high school graduates and high school dropouts during that time. 
We will show that a significant part of this high school dropout issue can be explained by 
the sharp increase in unmarried fertility.  
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   Following the theory presented in Section 2, we estimate the effect of unmarried 












RatioAbortion 000,1  
We construct effective Abortion ratio as 17-year lagged values of abortions per 
1,000 live births:36 
17−= itit RatioAbortionRatioAbortionEffective  
There are two sources of state-level data on abortion: surveys of abortion 
providers from the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), and state health department reports 
collected by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). We used the latter source, as Joyce 
(2003) argues that the CDC data is more reliable, since it includes estimates as early as 
1970, while AGI data begin with national legalization in 1973. The drawback of CDC 
data is that some states do not mandate reporting of abortion data, so missing data is 
problematic.37   However, due to limitations in the data on unmarried fertility, as 
described below, the missing CDC abortion data will not limit our analysis.38 
Similarly, we calculate the effective UFR for high school graduation rate as: 
17−= itit UFRUFREffective  
Unmarried fertility ratios are calculated based on data from birth certificates.  A 
serious measurement problem is that many states historically have not required a 
statement of marital status on the birth certificate, nd the number of states that do require 
                                                
36 Our estimation is robust to 18-year lags or the aver ge of 17- and 18-year lags. 
37 Kendall and Tamura (2010) used the same abortion data (i.e. the CDC data).  
38 Another drawback of both data sources is that no reliable data on illegal abortions before legalization is available.  
Following previous literature, we assume a zero abortion ratio before legalization in all states, though see Joyce (2003) 
for a critique of this assumption. 
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such information varies slightly over time.39  Since 1980, computer technology has 
allowed for inference of marital status based on paternity acknowledgements or by 
matching surnames of father and child; however, before 1980, data is simply missing for 
a significant number of states.  With minimal interpolation between years in a small 
number of cases, reliable time series data is available for 32 states over most of the years 
between 1923 and 2002.40  The set of reporting states is geographically diverse, although 
several well-populated states, including California, New York, and Massachusetts are 
unfortunately missing.41  The set of states with available data in each year is described 
fully in the Data Appendix. 
In addition to high school graduation rate, we examine two other important 
educational measures: secondary school enrollment rate and higher education enrollment 
rate. Secondary school enrollment rate quantifies th  percentage of the population ages 
14-17 enrolled in high school in state i and year t. Since high school students are roughly 
evenly distributed in the age range of 14 to 17, we define the effective UFR and effective 








aitit UFRUFREffective  
                                                
39 Another source of unreliability in the data is thesystematic underreporting of out-of-wedlock childbirth in Texas and 
Michigan over the 1990-1993 period due to legislation passed in those states.  We make no attempt to correct for this 
problem because children born during this period are, t most, 11 years old in 2000, the last year for which education 
data is used in estimation, and we focus on secondary and higher education measures. 
40 While the number of interpolated observations is small, the analysis of Murphy and Topel (1985) suggests 
interpolation may bias estimated standard errors.  Our results are robust to exclusion of all interpolated data. 
41 Alternatively, states may be grouped into census regions and race-specific unmarried fertility ratios f r other states 
within the same region may be applied to states with m ssing data.  This procedure has been generally used to estimate 
national trends in unmarried fertility, though less so in recent years as the break in trend between 1979 data calculated 
in this way and 1980 data calculated using the computerized inferral methods described in the text seem to imply 









aitit RatioAbortionRatioAbortionEffective  
Finally, the higher education enrollment rates measures the percentage of 18-to 
24-year olds who are enrolled in college in state i and year t. Similarly, we calculate 
















aitit RatioAbortionRatioAbortionEffective  
For each educational measure, panel data for between 20 and 32 states over years 
1940-2000 
(1947-2000 for higher education) are available to carry out the estimation of the 
equation below:42 
]3[).().()ln( 21 ittiitititit XRatioAbortionEffUFREffEducation εδαββ +++Γ++=
 
where iα and tδ  represent state and year fixed effects, respectively, and X is a 
vector of state-level covariates including school measures, such as average class size and 
relative teacher salary; economic measures, such as output per worker, years of schooling 
in the labor force, female labor force participation rate, church membership rates, 
urbanization and gender ratios, a measure of racial heterogeneity43.  The data appendix 
                                                
42 The differences in the number of states available in each year are due to the fact that not all state required 
registration of births as early as 1923.  Effective UFRs may be calculated for 20 states in 1957, but for 29 states by 
1961, and 32 states after 1966.   
43 Calculated as a “Herfindahl”-style index, racial heterogeneity = 1-[(%white)2+(%black)2+(%American 
Indian)2+(%Asian)2+(%other)2].  Thus, larger values are associated with greater heterogeneity, with a maximum value 
of 0.6875 (perfect heterogeneity), and a minimum value of 0 (perfect homogeneity). 
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gives details on the collection of each of these variables, and Table 2.1 provides some 
summary statistics for reference. 
 
4. Results 
A. Unmarried Fertility and Educational Attainment，1940-2000 
In any year of the sample period, the effective UFR is generally strongly 
correlated with education. Figure 2.2 shows a scatter plot of effective UFRs and the high 
school graduation rate (in natural log) for the 21 states for which data is available in 1940 
and the 32 states for which data is available in 2000. Since the average age of high school 
graduates is around 17, a state’s effective UFR in a given year should be of a magnitude 
similar to its actual UFR about 17 years earlier. In 2000, the effective UFRs in most 
states are in the range of 75-312, representing 75-312 unmarried births for every 1,000 
live births (the only exception is District of Columbia, with an effective UFR of 558). In 
comparison, the effective UFRs in 1940 are substantially lower, in the range of roughly 
7-85.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates a clear negative relationship between high school graduation 
rates and effective UFR across states in both years (similar relationships also hold for 
other education measures). Of course, this analysis is purely cross-sectional, nevertheless, 
we will show that formal empirical analysis generat similar results.   
Table 2.2 presents regression results of equation [2] for high school graduation 
rate using panel date from 1940 to 2000. Year- and state-fixed effects are included in all 
regressions to control for national secular trend ainvariant state characteristics, and 
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observations are weighted by total state population. All the estimates we presented are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across states, and an AR(1) process 
for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Pr is-Winsten approach. 
The first column presents an estimate of the effect of unmarried fertility on high 
school graduation rates without any control variables (other than year- and state-fixed 
effects). Though not statistically significant, the coefficient is negative, implying that 
higher UFRs are associated with lower high school graduation rates. The second column 
in Table 2.2 includes all covariates except for the eff ctive abortion rate. Including these 
covariates helps to control for omitted variables, but to the extent that unmarried fertility 
has indirect effects on high school graduation rate by changing the levels of the 
covariates, their inclusion may be inappropriate. I can be seen that inclusion of these 
controls strengthens the measured relationship between UFR and high school graduation 
rates. The coefficient on UFR implies that a steady-state increase in the effective UFR of 
100 per 1,000 live births is associated with about 4.6 percent decrease in high school 
graduation rates.  
In column 3, following our discussion on abortion in section 2.2, we estimate the 
effect of abortion ratios on high school graduation rates while excluding unmarried 
fertility. The estimate of the coefficient shows that effective abortion ratios by itself have 
positive but weak and statistically insignificant impacts on high school graduation rates. 
An increase in the effective abortion ratio of 100 per 1,000 live births is associated with 
only 0.3% increase in high school graduation rates. It i  somewhat surprising given the 
substantial impact of abortion ratios on crime found by Donohue and Levitt (2001) and 
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Kendall and Tamura (2010)44. One possible explanation is that an average aborted child, 
had him been born, was at higher risk of dropping out of high school only once, while he 
was more likely to commit crimes repeatedly.  
In column 4, we estimate the effects of unmarried fertility and abortion jointly on 
murder, and column 5 extends this model to include all the other covariates.45 As 
discussed earlier, abortion may affect education in two structural ways: it may reduce the 
number or timing of unwanted children (as in Donohue and Levitt, 2001), leading to a 
long run increase in education, and it may cause some women who do not wish to make 
use of abortion technology to have more unwanted children, leading to a long run 
decrease in education (as in Akerlof, et al, 1996).  The inclusion of both effective UFR 
and the effective abortion ratio allows us to separate these effects in the data, thus 
estimating the effects of abortion on crime through changes in the fertility behavior of 
married parents only. Comparison between columns 3 and 5 reveals that the controlling 
for UFR does not significantly increase the estimated effect of abortion; while 
comparison between columns 2 and 5 shows that the estimated effect of UFR stays 
roughly unchanged by the inclusion of abortion contr l. Thus it is not evident that 
abortion legalization will decrease high school graduation rate by increasing unmarried 
fertility.  
We now use results in column 5 to conduct counterfactual policy experiments. 
After the continuous growth in the first half of last century, US high school graduation 
                                                
44 Using same abortion data over period 1957-2000, Kendall and Tamura (2010) found that an increase of 100 abortions 
per 1,000 live births is associated with 10% less murder.  
45 A concern with the inclusion of both abortion and UFR is that both are proxies for unwantedness, potentially 
measured with error, and it is difficult to definitvely sign any biases associated with measurement error when the error 
may be correlated across regressors. 
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rates started to decline since 196546. This dropout problem is particularly surprising, 
given the rising wage differential between a high sc ool graduate and a high school 
dropout since 1980. The declines in high school graduation since the mid-1960s (for 
cohorts born in 1950) coincide with the start of explosion in out-of-wedlock births in the 
1950s. Between 1965 and 2000, the effective UFR for high school graduation rose from 
39.43 to 193.12, a change of 153.69. Using estimates on the coefficient of effective UFR 
in column 5, our results imply a ceteris paribus decrease in high school graduation rate of 
7.1%. In reality, the national high school graduation rate in our sample drops from 
80.15% to 69.76%, a roughly 10% decrease. Therefore, ur estimated effects of 
unmarried fertility can explain about 68% of decline i  high school graduation in recent 
decades. For further evidence, Table 2.3 presents the predicted high school graduation 
rates in 2000 for each state if the effective UFR stayed at the lower level in 1965.  
For policy purposes, a comparison in the relative siz s of the coefficients on 
unmarried fertility and abortion suggests that abortion is quite a blunt policy lever for 
enhancing education, relative to policies that promote effective family formation directly.  
Using the standard deviations listed in Table 2.1 for the 1971-2000 period, and the 
coefficients in the fifth column of Table 2.2, an increase of one standard deviation in the 
effective abortion ratio (184.40) is associated with a 0.7% increase in long-run high 
school graduation rates; while a one standard deviation increase in the effective UFR 
(108.57) is associated with a 5.0% decrease in long-ru  high school graduation rates. 
                                                
46 Heckman and Lafontain (2010) finds that since the lat  1960s the high school graduation rate has fallen by 4-5 
percentage points, despite the growing wage differentials between high school graduates and dropouts. Also see 
Warren (2005) for state-level trends. Definition of high school graduation rates in both works are slightly different from 
the one used in our paper. See section 3 for more discussion. 
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From these comparisons, policies that would incentivize more marriage seem to have 
higher productivity than those that would incentivize more abortion.  However, this 
analysis is highly incomplete since it does not take into account the potentially different 
costs of such policies. 
Finally, Column 6 includes a quadratic term in effective UFR in order to test in a 
simple way the implication of our model that the relationship between UFR and child 
educational development could be concave as shown in Figure 2.3. The estimates from 
column 6 do not seem to support the nonmonotonic relationship between effective UFR 
and high school graduation rates for our sample.47 However, simply including a quadratic 
term may be inappropriate if the effects of the covariates on the crime rate differ over 
time, and later we will analyze the effects of UFR on crime across different periods to 
control for such problems.   
Now we turn to the other two educational measures. Table 2.4 replicates all the 
estimations of Table 2.2 for the secondary school enrollment rate. Comparison between 
the two tables reveals a very similar effect of effective UFRs: an increase of 100 out-of-
wedlock child births per 1,000 live births is associated with 4.2 percent decrease in 
secondary school enrollment rate, in comparison to 4.6 percent decrease in high school 
graduation rate. The estimated effects of abortion ratios on the two educational measures 
are also very comparable in magnitude: an increase of 100 abortions per 1,000 live births 
is associated with 0.6 percent increase in secondary school enrollment, compared to 0.4 
percent increase in high school graduation rate. The similarity in findings across two 
                                                
47 The implied minimum graduation rate level from thequadratic is achieved when the effective UFR is 620, which is 
higher than all effective UFR values observed in our sample. 
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educational measures gives us stronger confidence i the negative implications of 
unmarried fertility on children’s human capital development.  
Column 6 of Table 2.4 weakly supports a concave relationship between unmarried 
fertility and secondary school enrollment rate, consistent with our theory discussed in 
section 2. The implied maximum point from the quadratic occurs when effective UFR is 
71.4. This means only the first 7.14 percent of parents who choose not to marry seem to 
benefit their children. Any more unmarried fertility beyond this point is detrimental to 
children’s educational development. Since the natiol average level of effective UFR for 
secondary school enrollment ranges from 27 to 207, therefore we mainly observe 
negative association between UFR and secondary school enrollment rate in our sample.  
Table 2.5 presents the same analysis for higher education enrollment. Contrary to 
our theory, we find positive relationship between unmarried fertility and higher education 
enrollment rate. On possible explanation for this inconsistent result is the migration 
across state borders for college education. If the effective UFR is higher in the state that 
has a larger size of the net immigration of college students (the number of out-of-state 
students minus the number of resident students attending colleges in other states), the 
effect of UFR on college enrollment can be biased upward. A good example is District of 
Columbia48. In 1992, only 7 percent of freshmen students were DC residents, while its 
effective UFR is the highest among all states in our sample, 399.7 (the next highest UFR 
is about 199 in Mississippi).  
                                                
48 Excluding only DC does not change the results much. 
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For the remainder of the section, we perform robustness checks on our results. 
Table 2.6 presents several checks on the robustness of the measured effects in Tables 2.2 
and 2.4. For readability, only the coefficient on effective UFR is presented, although the 
regression specification from which these coefficients are derived is the same as in 
column 5 of both Tables, where all covariates are included.   
The “baseline” row presents results from regressions dentical to those in column 
5 of Tables 2.2 and 2.4.  To the extent one is concerned that effective UFR is highly 
correlated with current UFR, and thus in some complicated way might simply be a proxy 
for current social conditions in a state, inclusion of the contemporaneous value for UFR 
would ameliorate these concerns.  Row 2 shows that controlling for contemporaneous 
UFR does not have much effect on the relationship between effective UFR and 
education.49 
Next, eliminating the population-based weighting scheme treats all states equally. 
As seen in the third row, this moderately lowers the estimated effect of unmarried fertility 
on high school graduation rates while increasing the effect on secondary school 
enrollment rate.  Changing our assumptions regarding the structure of the regression 
errors to ignore autocorrelation and cluster only at the state level nearly double the 
measured effects on both educational measures. The inclusion of a state-specific time 
trend soaks up almost all of the variation in the regressions; as a result, the coefficients on 
unmarried fertility for both measures become small and statistically insignificant. 
Excluding Washington, D.C. increases the estimated effect on high school graduation, 
                                                
49 The coefficient on contemporaneous UFR is insignifcant.  Alternatively, a falsification test by whic we simply 
replace effective UFR with the contemporaneous UFR reveals the same result: a small and insignificant oefficient on 
the contemporaneous UFR variable. 
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but decreases the effect on secondary school enrollment, yet the latter effect remains 
statistically significant at 5% level.   
Next, one may be concerned about how moments of the income distribution other 
than the mean might affect crime. Controlling for the percentage of the state population 
in poverty, the effect of UFR on high school graduation disappears, whereas the effect on 
secondary school enrollment stay statistically significant, though decreased 
substantially50. Controlling for racial population shares slightly lowers the coefficients for 
both measures. The inclusion of region-year fixed effects controls for any unmeasured 
factors that vary over time within nine census regions. It appears that these effects 
reduced the effects somehow, but the results stay statistically significant.  
One may be concerned that the long-time trend of high school graduation rate and 
secondary school enrollment rate can be driven by the rising wage premium associated 
with a high school diploma. We collected panel data on the average wage ratios between 
high school graduates and high school dropouts, between college dropouts and high 
school dropouts, and between college graduate and high school dropouts. Controlling for 
all these ratios does not change our main results, though they reduce the estimated effects 
slightly. Inclusion of dummies for Vietnam War period does not affect the results as well.  
Finally, we include contemporaneous measure of marriage behaviors in an 
attempt to address the question of whether illegitimacy is the fundamental cause of low 
educational achievement as presented in our model or it is a proxy for the effect of two-
parent household on children’s educational development. .  In the latter case, marriage 
                                                
50 Smaller sample can be a possible explanation, becaus  poverty rate is not available at the state level before 1969, 
except for the (t-1) census year, 1959. Thus, this row in Table 2.6 uses fewer data points than those in Tables 2.2 and 
2.4. 
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may have an ameliorative effect on children’s future p ospects even if the children were 
initially unwanted. To distinguish these effects in a simple way, we collected additional 
data on the share of adults 16 and older who were married in each state, from census 
records 1940-2000, inclusive. Inclusion of this variable reduced the estimated effects of 
unmarried fertility on high school graduation rate nd secondary school enrollment rates 
by 17% and 5%, respectively. However, illegitimacy remains significantly negatively 
related to both educational measures.  
 
B. “Social Stigma” Hypothesis Tests 
The theory discussed in section II implies that as the social stigma associated with 
unmarried childbirth decreases, the relationship betwe n unmarried fertility and 
children’s educational attainment should become more negative, since the marginal child 
born to unmarried parents becomes more likely to have benefited from having married 
parents. In this subsection, we seek to find empirical evidence for the theory. First, we 
consider how the effect of unmarried fertility on education differs over time, since social 
opinions towards unwed parents have changed substantially in the U.S over our sample 
period 1940-2000.  Second, we look at how the effect differs across racial groups, since 
stigma against unmarried fertility has generally been higher among whites than among 
nonwhites. 
Table 2.7 estimates the effects of unmarried fertility on education by repeating the 
analysis in column 5 of Table 2.2. The only differenc  is that we now divide the sample 
into two time periods, 1940-1970, and 1971-2000.  
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The first two columns imply that unmarried fertility is negatively related with 
high school graduation rate in the 1940-1970 period, but this relationship seems to 
disappear in the 1971-2000 period. These results contradict the theory, which suggests 
that in later years unmarried childbirth should induce greater losses for these children, 
since the waning social stigma leads parents of higher match quality to forego their 
marriage. Results from regressions on secondary school enrollment rate are also 
inconsistent with the social stigma theory. The unmarried fertility is negatively associated 
with secondary school enrollment rate for both periods, but the relationship becomes 
weaker in the latter period.  
A possible explanation for these results is a change in the composition of 
unmarried fertility towards parents in higher socio-demographic strata. Unmarried 
fertility has become less concentrated among teen mothers, less concentrated among 
nonwhites, and more children of unwed mothers are now living with both parents in a 
cohabitive home, as opposed to in single-parent homes (Ventura and Bachrach, 2000).   
As a second test of the “social stigma” hypothesis, we decompose the effects of 
unmarried fertility on education by racial group.  Unwed mothers have long faced lower 
levels of social stigma among nonwhite groups than among whites (Graefe and Lichter, 
2002, Cutright and Smith, 1988, Hogan and Kitagawa, 1985).  This may be part of the 
reason why unmarried fertility has generally been sig ificantly higher among nonwhites: 
the averages over the 1923-1990 span are 89.29 per 1,000 live births for whites, but 
264.99 per 1,000 live births for nonwhites. 
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Tables 2.8 and 2.9 separate white and nonwhite out-of-wedlock births in their 
effects on education.  Problematically, some states, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, 
did not report racially-disaggregated UFR data, leading to a reduction from the 1,856 
(1,863) observations previously employed over the 1940-2000 period to only 1,553 
(1,560) observations for high school graduation rate (secondary school enrollment rate).  
Many of the states that did report such data were concentrated in the South.  Thus, 
composition bias may cause these results to differ from the earlier analysis.  To check for 
this possibility, column 1 of Table 2.8 (Table 2.9) replicate the analysis from Table 2.2 
(Table 2.4), using the total effective UFR for only the observations for which racially-
disaggregated data is available.  Comparisons between this column and those in Tables 
2.2 (Table 2.4)) suggest a high degree of similarity. 
The rest of the columns estimate the effects of illegitimacy rates on education by 
racial groups. Columns 2 and 3 suggest that white unmarried fertility is negatively 
correlated with high school graduation rate but uncorrelated with secondary school 
enrollment rates. On the other hand, the coefficients o  estimates of nonwhite unmarried 
fertility are much smaller than its white counterpart, nd also not statistically different 
from 0 for both educational measures. It seems that the decline in high school graduation 
rate is mainly driven by the sharp increase in white UFR. These results also fail to 
support the theory, which suggest that nonwhite out-of-wedlock children may suffer from 
higher loss since better match quality parents tendo choose not to marry due to lower 




The paper has analyzed the relationship between unmarried fertility and children’s 
educational attainment over the period 1940-2000. Using state-level data from the United 
States between 1940 and 2000, we find that a steady-st te increase in unmarried fertility 
ratio of 100 per 1,000 child births could lead to a 4.6 percent drop in high school 
graduation rate and a steady-state 4.2 percent decline in secondary school enrollment rate 
in the long-run.. This result is important since Heckman and Lafontain (2010) finds that 
since the late 1960s the high school graduation rate h s fallen by 4-5 percentage points, 
despite the growing wage differentials between high sc ool graduates and dropouts. Our 
analysis shows that the rise in unmarried fertility predicts a ceteris paribus drop in high 
school graduation rate of about 7.1% between 1965 and 2000. In reality, the national high 
school graduation rate in our sample drops from 80.15% to 69.76%, a roughly 10% 
decrease. Therefore, our estimated effects of unmarried fertility can explain about 68% of 
decline in high school graduation in recent decades.   
Next, our results show that the correlation between unmarried fertility and 
children’s educational outcomes remains negative for all periods. These effects have 
generally decreased over time and that white unmarried fertility tends to be more 
correlated with child educational outcomes than nonwhite unmarried fertility.  
Moreover, we also find that after controls for unmarried fertility, a steady-state 
increase of 100 abortions per 1,000 live births is as ociated with 0.6 percent increase in 
secondary school enrollment and 0.4 percent increase in high school graduation rate. For 
policy purposes, a comparison in the relative sizes of the coefficients on unmarried 
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fertility and abortion suggests that abortion is quite a blunt policy lever for enhancing 
education, relative to policies that promote effective family formation directly. In 
particular, an increase of one standard deviation in the effective abortion ratio (184.40) is 
associated with a 0.7% increase in long-run high school graduation rates; while a one 
standard deviation increase in the effective UFR (108.57) is associated with a 5.0% 
decrease in long-run high school graduation rates. From these comparisons, policies that 
would incentivize more marriage seem to have higher productivity than those that would 
incentivize more abortion.  However, this analysis i  highly incomplete since it does not 
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Figure 2.1: Unmarried Fertility Ratio: 1923-2002 
 
 
Notes: The unmarried fertility ratio (UFR), 1923-2002, calculated as births to unmarried women 
per 1,000 live births. Calculations are based on 32 states for which data on mother’s marital status 
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Notes: Observations represent states with available time-series data on unmarried fertility ratios 
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Notes: High school graduation ratio is the percentage of 17-year olds who have a high school 
diploma. High school graduation ratio (Tamura and Bai) is the weighted average of state-level 
ratios constructed by authors, NCES high school graduation ratio is fr m Digest of Education 
Statistics. High School completion data is the percentage of entering high school freshmen who 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
Notes: Out of a theoretical maximum of 992 observations between 1940 and 1970, 
missing data limits the number of observations.  Data on AFDC payments per family are 
lagged 15 years, and so correspond to 1925-1955 and 1956-1985.   
 
 
  1940-70 (N=903)   1971-2000 (N=960) 
Mean SD Mean SD 
High school gradution rates 0.61 0.15 0.75 0.09 
Secondary school enrollment rates 0.81 0.14 0.92 0.06 
Higher education enrollment rates 0.18 0.10 0.46 0.11 
UFR per 1,000 live births 58.81 45.37 228.33 108.78 
White UFR per 1,000 live births 27.80 20.55 120.14 57.41 
Nonwhite UFR per 1,000 live births 204.46 84.33 483.89 139.19 
Effective UFR per 1,000 live births: 
      High school gradution rates 38.02 27.37 108.57 77.87 
      Secondary school enrollment rates 39.03 28.09 116.48 80.92 
      Higher education enrollment rates 38.45 26.90 90.10 67.97 
Effective abortions per 1,000 live births: 
      High school gradution rates 221.29 184.40 
      Secondary school enrollment rates 230.38 186.72 
      Higher education enrollment rates 194.18 147.65 
Female labor force participation rate 0.34 0.08 0.64 0.09 
Pupil teacher ratio 24.48 3.67 19.60 3.10 
Relative teacher salary 2.23 0.35 1.99 0.37 
Average years of schooling 9.66 1.05 12.23 0.87 
fraction population with  < 8 years 
schooling 0.39 0.13 0.16 0.07 
Real output per worker ($1997) 27566.67 6469.51 43827.28 7041.18 
AFDC payments per family 3201.95 2772.64 6868.63 2623.78 
% of population church members 37.12 11.72 24.49 11.49 
% Urban 58.38 16.79 67.73 14.78 
% Male 49.73 1.09 48.79 0.81 
Racial Heterogeneity Index 0.18 0.15 0.24 0.13 
% 15+ population married 65.55 3.29 58.34 5.41 
New marriages per 100 marriage stock 3.35 6.95 2.98 4.59 
Divorces per 100 marriage stock 0.68 1.12 1.10 0.48 
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Table 2.2. The Effects of Out-of-Wedlock Childbirth on High School Graduation Rate, 1940-2000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the high school graduation rate. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Regressions 
based on 1,856 observations for 32 states over the 1940-2002 period. Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions, and 
observations are weighted by total state population.  Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal 
correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten approach.   
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effective UFR (x 100) -0.006 (0.021) -0.046 (0.019) -0.006 (0.021) -0.046 (0.019) -0.060 (0.032) 
Effective UFR2 (x 10,000) 0.004 (0.007) 
Effe Abortion Ratio (x100) 0.003 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.005) 
Mom's School Years -0.015 (0.018) -0.016 (0.018) -0.016 (0.018) -0.017 (0.018) 
Female(<=44) Labor Force 
Participation Rate -0.003 (0.198) 0.125 (0.196) 0.014 (0.198) 0.025 (0.199) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio (L.1-12) -0.011 (0.003) -0.012 (0.003) -0.011 (0.003) -0.011 (0.003) 
Relative Teacher Salary (L.1-
12) 0.042 (0.031) 0.046 (0.031) 0.043 (0.031) 0.046 (0.03 ) 
Average School Years 0.139 (0.021) 0.143 (0.022) 0.139 (0.021) 0.138 (0.022) 
% with <8 yrs of schooling -0.136 (0.155) -0.024 (0.159) -0.136 (0.154) -0.152 (0.158) 
ln (real output per worker) 
(1997$) -0.119 (0.040) -0.115 (0.040) -0.117 (0.040) -0.116 (0.040) 
AFDC  -0.025 (0.016) -0.025 (0.017) -0.025 (0.016) -0.026 (0.016) 
% Church 0.298 (0.076) 0.276 (0.075) 0.296 (0.076) 0.297 (0.075) 
% Urban 0.156 (0.138) 0.151 (0.139) 0.150 (0.139) 0.158 (0.138) 
% Male 4.468 (1.639) 4.056 (1.633) 4.525 (1.637) 4.613 (1.646) 
Racial heterogeneity index -0.120 (0.122) -0.131 (0.124) -0.124 (0.122) -0.110 ( .123) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.92 
Obs. 1856 1856 1856 1856 1856 1856 
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UFR data is 
missing 
 High School Graduation Rate 
Actual Values 
 
Predicted Values in 2000 
1965 2000 
 
If Effecitve UFR stayed at 
the 1965 level  
 If Racial heterogeneity 
index stayed at the 1965 
level  
If both varibales stayed at 
the 1965 level  
New England 
Maine 0 0.87 0.79 
 
0.84 0.80 0.84 
Rhode Island 0 0.77 0.67 
 
0.72 0.69 0.74 
Connecticut 1 0.87 0.83 
 
0.88 0.85 0.91 
Massachusetts 1 0.89 0.75 
 
0.80 0.77 0.82 
New Hampshire 1 0.89 0.79 
 
0.84 0.79 0.85 
Vermont 1 0.77 0.87 
 
0.93 0.88 0.94 
Middle Atlantic 
New Jersey 0 0.88 0.80 
 
0.88 0.83 0.90 
Pennsylvania 0 0.90 0.77 
 
0.83 0.78 0.85 
New York 1 0.81 0.65 
 
0.70 0.67 0.73 
East North Central 
Delaware 0 0.82 0.67 
 
0.73 0.68 0.75 
District of 
Columbia 
0 0.56 0.56 
 
0.70 0.57 0.70 
Florida 0 0.70 0.59 
 
0.64 0.59 0.65 
North Carolina 0 0.73 0.61 
 
0.65 0.62 0.66 
South Carolina 0 0.66 0.59 
 
0.63 0.59 0.63 
Virginia 0 0.68 0.73 
 
0.78 0.74 0.79 
West Virginia 0 0.83 0.82 
 
0.86 0.82 0.86 
Georgia 1 0.68 0.58 
 
0.62 0.59 0.63 
Maryland 1 0.79 0.76 
 
0.82 0.78 0.85 
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UFR data is 
missing 
 High School Graduation Rate 
Actual Values 
 
Predicted Values in 2000 
1965 2000 
 
If Effecitve UFR stayed at 
the 1965 level  
 If Racial heterogeneity 
index stayed at the 1965 
level  
If both varibales stayed 
at the 1965 level  
West North Central 
Alabama 0 0.73 0.65 
 
0.70 0.65 0.70 
Kentucky 0 0.68 0.71 
 
0.76 0.71 0.76 
Mississippi 0 0.62 0.60 
 
0.67 0.60 0.67 
Tennessee 0 0.71 0.60 
 
0.65 0.61 0.66 
South Atlantic 
Louisiana 0 0.69 0.65 
 
0.70 0.65 0.71 
Texas 0 0.68 0.68 
 
0.72 0.70 0.74 
Arkansas 1 0.76 0.72 
 
0.77 0.73 0.77 
Oklahoma 1 0.85 0.74 
 
0.78 0.76 0.80 
East South Central 
Nevada 0 0.85 0.59 
 
0.62 0.60 0.64 
Utah 0 0.88 0.79 
 
0.81 0.80 0.83 
Wyoming 0 0.89 0.79 
 
0.82 0.80 0.83 
Arizona 1 0.73 0.55 
 
0.57 0.56 0.59 
Colorado 1 0.82 0.67 
 
0.70 0.69 0.72 
Idaho 1 0.89 0.76 
 
0.79 0.77 0.81 
Montana 1 0.87 0.80 
 
0.84 0.81 0.85 
New Mexico 1 0.76 0.66 
 
0.69 0.69 0.72 
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Table 2.3. The Counterfactual Predictions for High School Graduation Rates for All States in 2000 (Continued.) 
Notes: Predictions are based on regression results in column 5 of Table 2. For states where UFR data are missing, the average UFR 





UFR data is 
missing 
 High School Graduation Rate 
Actual Values 
 
Predicted Values in 2000 
1965 2000 
 
If Effecitve UFR stayed at 
the 1965 level  
 If Racial heterogeneity 
index stayed at the 1965 
level  
If both varibales stayed at 
the 1965 level  
West South Central  
Oregon 0 0.94 0.67 
 
0.71 0.68 0.73 
Washington 0 0.92 0.71 
 
0.76 0.73 0.78 
Alaska 1 0.52 0.67 
 
0.71 0.68 0.72 
California 1 0.84 0.68 
 
0.73 0.72 0.77 
Hawaii 1 0.81 0.82 
 
0.88 0.84 0.89 
Mountain 
Iowa 0 0.92 0.82 
 
0.86 0.83 0.87 
Kansas 0 0.80 0.74 
 
0.78 0.76 0.80 
Minnesota 0 0.94 0.82 
 
0.86 0.84 0.88 
Missouri 0 0.79 0.72 
 
0.78 0.73 0.79 
North Dakota 0 0.87 0.86 
 
0.90 0.87 0.91 
South Dakota 0 0.85 0.79 
 
0.85 0.80 0.86 
Nebraska 1 0.90 0.84 
 
0.89 0.86 0.91 
Pacific 
Illinois 0 0.80 0.71 
 
0.79 0.73 0.81 
Indiana 0 0.83 0.68 
 
0.73 0.69 0.74 
Michigan 0 0.80 0.74 
 
0.79 0.75 0.80 
Wisconsin 0 0.93 0.79 
 
0.84 0.80 0.85 
Ohio 1 0.84 0.76   0.83 0.77 0.84 
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Table 2.4. The Effects of Out-of-Wedlock Childbirth on Secondary school enrollment Rate, 1940-2000 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the secondary school enr l ment rate. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Regressions based on 1,863 observations for 32 states over the 1940-2002 period. Year and state fixed effects are included in all 
regressions, and observations are weighted by total state populati n.  Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-
Winsten approach. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effective UFR (x 100) -0.010 (0.020) -0.040 (0.017) -0.014 (0.020) -0.042 (0.016) 0.020 (0.033) 
Effective UFR2 (x 10,000) -0.014 (0.007) 
Effe Abortion Ratio (x100) 0.004 (0.006) 0.013 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 0.010 (0.006) 
Mom's School Years -0.012 (0.013) -0.015 (0.014) -0.014 (0.014) -0.009 (0.014) 
Female(<=44) Labor Force 
Participation Rate -0.271 (0.137) -0.173 (0.135) -0.252 (0.134) -0.284 (0.133) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio (L.1-12) -0.005 (0.002) -0.005 (0.002) -0.005 (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) 
Relative Teacher Salary (L.1-
12) 0.019 (0.022) 0.022 (0.022) 0.021 (0.022) 0.010 (0.021) 
School Years 0.063 (0.013) 0.066 (0.013) 0.063 (0.013) 0.069 (0.014) 
% with <8 yrs of schooling -0.037 (0.095) 0.040 (0.093) -0.045 (0.094) 0.006 (0.098) 
ln(real output per worker) 
(1997$) 0.034 (0.022) 0.037 (0.022) 0.035 (0.022) 0.037 (0.022) 
AFDC  -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) 
% Church 0.177 (0.057) 0.158 (0.056) 0.175 (0.057) 0.167 (0.056) 
% Urban 0.474 (0.090) 0.482 (0.090) 0.468 (0.089) 0.434 (0.09 ) 
% Male 4.396 (1.155) 4.032 (1.142) 4.509 (1.150) 4.158 (1.13 ) 
Racial heterogeneity index -0.203 (0.087) -0.216 (0.088) -0.211 (0.087) -0.276 (0.090) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.70 0.83 0.83 0.71 0.83 0.83 
Obs. 1863 1863 1863 1863 1863 1863 
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Table 2.5. The Effects of Out-of-Wedlock Childbirth on Higher Education Rate, 1947-2000 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the higher education enrollment rate. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Regressions based on 1,652 observations for 32 states over the 1947-2002 period. Year and state fixed effects are included in all 
regressions, and observations are weighted by total state populati n.  Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-
Winsten approach. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effective UFR (x 100) 0.054 (0.033) -0.120 (0.207) 0.052 (0.034) 0.063 (0.031) 0.092 (0.056) 
Effective UFR2 (x 10,000) -0.007 (0.011) 
Effe Abortion Ratio (x100) 0.002 (0.014) 0.004 (0.016) -0.002 (0.014) 0.002 (0.016) 
Mom's School Years -0.027 (0.027) -0.024 (0.028) -0.026 (0.027) -0.024 (0.027) 
Female(<=44) Labor Force 
Participation Rate -0.186 (0.305) -0.330 (0.297) -0.194 (0.300) -0.188 (0.300) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio (L.1-
12) -0.024 (0.005) -0.023 (0.005) -0.024 (0.005) -0.024 (0.005) 
Relative Teacher Salary 
(L.1-12) -0.003 (0.038) -0.003 (0.038) -0.003 (0.038) -0.009 (0.039) 
Average School Years -0.019 (0.024) -0.024 (0.024) -0.019 (0.024) -0.017 (0.024) 
% with <8 yrs of schooling -0.280 (0.164) -0.344 (0.164) -0.278 (0.164) -0.264 (0.166) 
ln (real output per worker) 
(1997$) 0.002 (0.038) 0.000 (0.038) 0.002 (0.038) 0.002 (0.038) 
AFDC  0.004 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009) 
% Church -0.126 (0.120) -0.109 (0.120) -0.126 (0.120) -0.130 ( .120) 
% Urban 0.413 (0.238) 0.415 (0.233) 0.415 (0.232) 0.392 (0.235) 
% Male -13.182 (3.229) -12.675 (3.214) -13.183 (3.190) -13.206 (3.190) 
Racial heterogeneity index -0.579 (0.219) -0.566 (0.218) -0.576 (0.217) -0.608 (0.223) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Obs. 1652 1652 1652 1652 1652 1652 
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Notes: Values are coefficients on effective unmarried fertility ratio (UFR). Coefficients on other covariates are 














  HS grad. rate Sec. enrollment  rate 
Baseline -0.046 (2.40) -0.042 (2.60) 
Include contemporaneous UFR control -0.045 (2.36 ) -0.042 (2.63) 
Unweighted regression -0.039 (2.21 ) -0.064 (2.96) 
Assume no autocorrelation, cluster errors at state level -0.075 (6.38) -0.077 (9.92) 
Include a state-specific linear time trend -0.020 ( .82) -0.003 (0.12) 
Exclude D.C. -0.056 (2.46) -0.030 (1.65) 
Include poverty rate (1049, 1056) -0.002 (0.12) -0.028 (1.49) 
Include % black  -0.039 (2.05) -0.034 (2.09) 
Include (region x year) fixed effects -0.030 (1.51) -0.027 (1.44) 
Include wage ratios btw hs (college) grad and hs dropout -0.038 (2.01) -0.032 (1.99) 
include dummies for vietnam war period -0.046 (2.40) -0.042 (2.60) 
Include % married -0.038 (1.86) -0.040 (2.31) 
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Table 2.7. Temporal Variation in the Effect of Unmarried Fertility on Education 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions based on observations for 32 states over the 1940-2000 time period.  Missing 
data limits the number of observations, however.  Year and state fixed effects ar  included in all regressions, and observations are 
weighted by total state population.  Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across 
states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten approach.
  HS grad. Rate   Sec. enrollment rate 
  1940-1970   1971-2000   1940-1970   1971-2000 
Effective UFR (x 100) -0.198 (0.051)   0.016 (0.019)   -0.034 (0.045)   -0.016 (0.021) 
Effe Abortion Ratio (x100) 0.007 (0.004) 0.013 (0.006) 
Mom's School Years -0.019 (0.042) -0.059 (0.018) -0.035 (0.022) -0.043 (0.020) 
Female(<=44) Labor Force Participation Rate -0.077 (0.342) -0.445 (0.298) 0.058 (0.219) -0.723 (0.238) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio (L.1-12) 0.003 (0.004) -0.014 (0.005) -0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) 
Relative Teacher Salary (L.1-12) 0.036 (0.035) -0.038 (0.039) -0.013 (0.023) -0.010 (0.031) 
School Years 0.198 (0.031) 0.054 (0.026) 0.112 (0.024) 0.031 (0.017) 
% with <8 yrs of schooling -0.904 (0.292) -0.034 (0.179) -0.547 (0.145) 0.139 (0.128) 
ln (real output per worker) (1997$) -0.120 (0.053) -0.119 (0.066) 0.065 (0.024) -0.015 (0.042) 
AFDC  -0.074 (0.029) 0.008 (0.016) -0.017 (0.013) 0.004 (0.010) 
% Church 0.084 (0.131) 0.380 (0.223) -0.128 (0.079) 0.246 (0.186) 
% Urban 0.374 (0.212) 0.034 (0.185) 0.675 (0.166) 0.137 (0.130) 
% Male 1.864 (1.604) -1.236 (2.814) 2.206 (1.106) -1.044 (1.798) 
Racial heterogeneity index -0.258 (0.263) -0.044 (0.212) -0.597 (0.179) -0.140 (0.134) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.76 
Obs. 903  953  903  960 
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Table 2.8. Racially Disaggregated Effect of Unmarried Fertility on High School 
Graduation Rates 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions based on observations for 32 states over the 
1940-2000 time period.  Missing data limits the number of observations, however.  Year and state 
fixed effects are included in all regressions, and observations are weighted by total state population.  
Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across 
states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten 
approach. All variables used as controls in Table 2.2 are also included in these regressions.  
   High School Graduation Rate 
   Entire Population Disaggregated by Race 
Effective UFR (x 100)  -0.041 (0.020)       
Effective UFR (white) (x 100)  -0.070 (0.029) -0.149 (0.058) 
Effective UFR2 (white) (x 100)  0.042 (0.025) 
Effective UFR (nonwhite) (x 100)  0.001 (0.005) -0.003 (0.011) 




Effe Abortion Ratio (x100)  0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 
Mom's School Years  0.000 (0.017) -0.007 (0.017) 0.000 (0.000) 
Female(<=44) Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
 
0.108 (0.207) 0.142 (0.203) 0.000 (0.000) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio (L.1-12)  -0.014 (0.003) -0.014 (0.003) -0.009 (0.017) 
Relative Teacher Salary (L.1-12)  -0.030 (0.031) -0.020 (0.030) 0.153 (0.200) 
School Years  0.096 (0.024) 0.092 (0.023) -0.013 (0.003) 
% with <8 yrs of schooling  -0.060 (0.167) -0.038 (0.174) -0.021 (0.030) 
ln (real output per worker) 
(1997$) 
 
-0.154 (0.050) -0.153 (0.050) 0.095 (0.023) 
AFDC   -0.015 (0.018) -0.015 (0.018) -0.014 (0.171) 
% Church  0.227 (0.080) 0.207 (0.079) -0.150 (0.049) 
% Urban  -0.143 (0.157) -0.089 (0.153) -0.016 (0.018) 
% Male  -0.438 (1.973) -0.240 (1.988) 0.210 (0.077) 
Racial heterogeneity index  0.237 (0.133) 0.269 (0.133) -0.093 (0.150) 
State FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.94 0.94 0.94 
Obs.  1553   1553   1553   
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Table 2.9. Racially Disaggregated Effect of Unmarried Fertility on Secondary School 
Enrollment Rates 
  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions based on observations for 32 states over the 1940-
2000 time period.  Missing data limits the number of observations, however.  Year and state fixed 
effects are included in all regressions, and observations are weighted by total state population.  
Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across state , 
and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten approach. All 
variables used as controls in Table 2.4 are also included in these regressions.  
 
  Secondary Enrollment Rate 
  Entire Population   Disaggregated by Race 
Effective UFR (x 100) -0.038 (0.016)       
Effective UFR (white) (x 100) -0.026 (0.027) -0.103 (0.063) 
Effective UFR2 (white) (x 100) 0.035 (0.026) 
Effective UFR (nonwhite) (x 100) -0.007 (0.006) 0.002 (0.014) 
Effective UFR2 (nonwhite) (x 100) -0.001 (0.002) 
Effe Abortion Ratio (x100) 0.005 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) 
Mom's School Years 0.009 (0.014) 0.006 (0.015) 0.000 (0.000) 
Female(<=44) Labor Force 
Participation Rate -0.305 (0.156) -0.247 (0.153) 0.00  (0.000) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio (L.1-12) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.005 (0.015) 
Relative Teacher Salary (L.1-12) -0.036 (0.024) -0.031 (0.024) -0.243 (0.151) 
School Years 0.021 (0.014) 0.017 (0.015) -0.002 (0.003) 
% with <8 yrs of schooling -0.055 (0.103) -0.056 (0.109) -0.031 (0.024) 
ln (real output per worker) (1997$) 0.038 (0.027) 0.036 (0.028) 0.019 (0.015) 
AFDC  0.003 (0.008) 0.003 (0.008) -0.050 (0.110) 
% Church 0.138 (0.061) 0.122 (0.061) 0.035 (0.028) 
% Urban 0.170 (0.107) 0.205 (0.106) 0.003 (0.008) 
% Male -1.949 (1.543) -1.670 (1.581) 0.112 (0.061) 
Racial heterogeneity index 0.140 (0.092) 0.148 (0.094) 0.200 (0.105) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 
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Table 1.9. Divorce Laws by States 
Source: Friedberg(1998); Gruber(2004) 


























Alabama 1971 1971 0 Montana 1973 1973 1 
Alaska 1935 1935 1 Nebraska 1972 1972 1 
Arizona 1931 1973 1 Nevada 1931 1967 1 
Arkansas 1937 New Hampshire 1971 1971 0 
California 1970 1970 1 New Jersey 1971 
Colorado 1972 1972 1 New Mexico 1933 1933 1 
Connecticut 1973 1973 0 New York 1967 
Delaware 1957 North Carolina 1910 
DC 1966 North Dakota 1971 1971 0 
Florida 1971 1971 0 Ohio 1974 
Georgia 1973 1973 0 Oklahoma 1953 1953 1b 
Hawaii 1965 1972 1 Oregon 1971 1971 1 
Idaho 1945 1971 0 Pennsylvania 1980 
Illinois 1984 Rhode Island 1910 1975 0 
Indiana 1973 1973 1 South Carolina 1969 
Iowa 1970 1970 0 South Dakota 1985 1985 0 
Kansas 1969 1969 0 Tennessee 1963 
Kentucky 1962 1972 1a Texas 
pre-
1910 1970 0 
Louisiana 1916 Utah 1943 1987 1 
Maine 1973 1973 1 Vermont 1969 
Maryland 1969 Virginia 1960 
Massachusetts 1975 1975 0 Washington 1921 1973 1 
Michigan 1972 1972 0 West Virginia 1969 
Minnesota 1933 1974 1 Wisconsin 
pre-
1910 1978 1 
Mississippi 1978 Wyoming 1977 1977 0 
Missouri 1974               
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Waiver TANF   
State 
Waiver TANF 
month year limit month year limit   month year limit month year limit 
Alabama    
11 1996 60 
 
Montana 
   
2 1997 60 
Alaska    
7 1997 60 
 
Nebraska 1 1996 24 12 1996 60 
Arizona 11 1995 24 10 1996 24  
Nevada 
   
1 1998 60 
Arkansas    
7 1998 24 
 
New Hampshire 
   
10 1996 60 
California    
1 1998 60 
 
New Jersey 
   
2 1997 60 
Colorado    
7 1997 60 
 
New Mexico 
   
7 1997 60 
Connecticut 1 1996 21 10 1996 21  
New York 
   
12 1996 
 
Delaware 10 1995 48 3 1997 48  
North Carolina 8 1996 24 1 1997 60 
DC    
3 1997 60 
 
North Dakota 
   
7 1997 60 
Florida    
10 1996 48 
 
Ohio 6 1996 36 10 1997 60 
Georgia    
1 1997 48 
 
Oklahoma 
   
10 1996 60 
Hawaii 12 1996 60 7 1997 60  
Oregon 7 1995 24 6 1996 
 
Idaho    
7 1997 24 
 
Pennsylvania 
   
3 1997 60 
Illinois    
7 1997 60 
 
Rhode Island 
   
5 1997 60 
Indiana 4 1995 24 10 1996 24  
South Carolina 6 1996 24 10 1996 60 
Iowa    
1 1997 60 
 
South Dakota 
   
12 1996 60 
Kansas    
10 1996 60 
 
Tennessee 9 1996 18 10 1996 60 
Kentucky    
10 1996 60 
 
Texas 5 1996 24 1 1997 60 
Louisiana 1 1997 24 1 1997 60  
Utah 
   
1 1997 36 
Maine    
11 1996 60 
 
Vermont 
   
9 1996 
 
Maryland    
1 1997 60 
 
Virginia 7 1995 24 2 1997 60 
Massachusetts    
12 1996 
  
Washington 1 1996 48 8 1997 60 




   
1 1997 60 
Minnesota    
7 1997 60 
 
Wisconsin 
   
9 1996 60 
Mississippi    
10 1996 60 
 
Wyoming 
   
1 1997 60 
Missouri 4 1995 48 7 1997 60                 
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Table 1.11. Work Requirement Time limits under Waiver and TANF 
State 
Waiver     1st  TANF Plan 2nd TANF Plan 
month1 year1 work TL month2 year2  work TL month3 year3 work TL 
Alabama       11 1996 0       
Alaska 
  
  7 1997 24 
   
Arizona 
  
  10 1996 24 10 1999 0 
Arkansas 
  
  7 1997 0 
   
California 9 1995 22 1 1998 0 
   
Colorado 
  
  7 1997 24 
   
Connecticut 
  
  10 1996 0 
   
Delaware 10 1995 24 3 1997 24 1 2000 0 
District of Columbia 
  
  3 1997 24 10 1999 1 
Florida 
  
  10 1996 0 
   
Georgia 
  
  1 1997 0 10 1999 24 
Hawaii 
  
  7 1997 24 
   
Idaho 
  
  7 1997 0 
   
Illinois 10 1995 12 7 1997 24 10 1999 0 
Indiana 
  
  10 1996 0 
   
Iowa 
  
  1 1997 0 
   
Kansas 
  
  10 1996 0 
   
Kentucky 
  
  10 1996 6 10 2002 24 
Louisiana 
  
  1 1997 24 
   
Maine 
  
  11 1996 24 10 2002 0 
Maryland 
  
  1 1997 0 
   
Massachusetts 10 1995 2 9 1996 2 
   
Michigan 10 1994 12 9 1996 2 
   
Minnesota 
  
  7 1997 24 10 2002 0 
Mississippi 
  
  10 1996 24 
   
Missouri 4 1995 24 7 1997 24 
   
Montana 2 1996 24 2 1997 24 1 2000 0 
Nebraska 
  
  12 1996 0 
   
Nevada 
  
  12 1996 24 10 2002 0 
New Hampshire 7 1996 0 10 1996 0 



































  2 1997 24 10 2001 0 
New Mexico 
  
  2 1997 2 12 1999 3 
New York 
  
  12 1996 24 
   
North Carolina 
  
  1 1997 24 10 1999 3 
North Dakota 
  
  7 1997 24 10 1999 0 
Ohio 
  
  10 1996 24 10 2002 0 
Oklahoma 
  
  10 1996 0 
   
Oregon 
  
  10 1996 0 
   
Pennsylvania 
  
  3 1997 24 10 2002 0 
Rhode Island 
  
  5 1997 24 10 1999 2 
South Carolina 
  
  10 1996 24 10 1999 0 
South Dakota 4 1994 24 12 1996 2 10 2002 0 
Tennessee 
  
  10 1996 24 10 1999 0 
Texas 
  
  11 1996 0 
   
Utah 
  
  10 1996 0 
   
Vermont 7 1994 30 9 1996 30 
   
Virginia 
  
  2 1997 0 1 2000 3 
Washington 
  
  8 1997 0 
   
West Virginia 
  
  1 1997 24 1 2000 0 
Wisconsin 
  
  9 1996 0 
   
Wyoming       1 1997 0       
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Table 1.12. AFDC/TANF Real Benefit Levels: Selected Years 
State 
Real Benefit for Family of 2 Real Benefit per Child 
1978 1996 1997 2002 1978 1996 1997 2002 
Alabama 135 85 83 74 46 19 19 17 
Alaska 537 523 511 455 77 66 64 58 
Arizona 212 176 172 153 57 45 44 39 
Arkansas 206 103 100 89 41 27 27 24 
California 443 323 285 296 103 64 67 63 
Colorado 324 178 174 156 74 48 47 42 
Connecticut 356 285 279 248 199 61 60 53 
Delaware 311 171 168 150 64 44 43 38 
District of 
Columbia 307 212 207 164 87 55 40 47 
Florida 209 154 151 135 46 39 38 34 
Georgia 156 147 143 128 35 32 31 28 
Hawaii 598 360 352 314 120 94 92 82 
Idaho 428 161 157 163 67 41 40 0 
Illinois 330 217 212 189 90 24 23 21 
Indiana 268 147 143 128 77 37 36 32 
Iowa 437 228 222 198 84 44 43 38 
Kansas 399 214 209 186 80 43 42 38 
Kentucky 207 126 123 110 77 41 40 36 
Louisiana 166 93 91 109 49 28 27 24 
Maine 282 198 193 190 100 69 67 67 
Maryland 265 189 186 193 72 49 49 51 
Massachusetts 426 312 305 297 90 57 55 54 
Michigan 465 226 221 197 112 66 65 58 
Minnesota 543 282 276 246 54 57 55 49 
Mississippi 110 61 60 81 37 15 15 13 
Missouri 276 154 151 135 58 32 31 28 
Montana 275 233 217 220 117 47 55 54 
Nebraska 383 187 183 163 92 45 44 39 




































New Hampshire 414 310 303 298 58 40 39 35 
New Jersey 426 229 224 200 74 41 40 36 
New Mexico 253 187 193 172 49 56 50 44 
New York 479 298 291 260 126 70 69 61 
North Carolina 255 157 154 137 26 16 16 14 
North Dakota 359 220 215 202 104 55 54 52 
Ohio 275 166 163 158 86 51 50 49 
Oklahoma 299 149 146 124 87 47 45 38 
Oregon 514 226 221 197 52 67 65 58 
Pennsylvania 354 197 193 172 109 60 59 52 
Rhode Island 520 302 295 263 15 51 50 44 
South Carolina 120 101 99 89 35 26 26 23 
South Dakota 399 243 237 212 61 31 31 27 
Tennessee 147 92 90 80 40 26 26 23 
Texas 141 96 93 89 37 24 24 22 
Utah 374 226 221 208 100 46 45 43 
Vermont 560 358 362 304 86 48 34 46 
Virginia 213 150 146 146 150 36 35 32 
Washington 477 287 280 250 98 61 60 53 
West Virginia 250 124 121 193 66 38 37 59 
Wisconsin 479 265 259 374 112 64 63 0 
Wyoming 391 210 206 189 38 19 19 0 
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Abortion data is from Centers for Disease Control, “Abortion Surveillance 
Report” [annual]. 
AFDC 
 Total payments divided by families receiving payments, from United States 
Statistical Abstract [annual]  
Church Membership 
Number of church members declared by 114 religious bodies in each state, 
divided by the total population.  Studies were performed in 1952, 1971, 1980, 
1990, and 2000 (e.g., Quinn, et al, 1982).  Data for other years is linearly 
interpolated. 
Enrollment Rates 
Percent of population aged 14-17, and 18-24, enrolled in high school and college, 
respectively.  See data appendix of Turner, et al. (2007) for details. 
High School Graduate Numbers, Public 
Public school graduate number data between 1945 and 2003 is available from 
United States Statistical Abstract [annual]. Missing data in 1951, 53, 55, 61, 83, 
84, 86 are linearly interpolated.  
High School Graduate Numbers, Private 
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Private School graduate number data for 1964-1980 and 1991-2002 is available 
from Digest of Educational Statistics [annual]. Data in 1940, 41 and 47 is 
available from Biennial Survey of Education [biennial] 
Low Human Capital Population 
Percent of state labor force members with fewer than 9 years of schooling, 
adjusted for migration, from Turner, et al. (2007). 
Percent Urban 
Percent of resident population living in metropolitan statistical areas, from Bureau 
of the Census United States Statistical Abstract [ nnual] 
Population by Age and Gender 
From Estimates for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States by 5 Year 
Age Groups and Sex: Annual Time Series Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau 
[annual]. 
Real output per worker 
Income per worker, from Bureau of Economic Analysis, converted to 2003 
dollars with the consumer price index.  See data appendix of Turner, et al. (2007) 
for details. 
Schooling, Average Years 
Average years of schooling among labor force participants.  See data appendix of 
Turner, et al. (2007). 
Unemployment 
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Figures used represent the percent unemployed among civilian non-institutional 
population 16 years and older, with total unemployment estimates based on the 
Current Population Survey, taken from Bureau of theC nsus United States 
Statistical Abstract [annual].   
Unmarried Fertility Ratio 
Births to unmarried mothers, as a fraction of 1,000 live births. 1925-1936: Data 
are from Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States [annual].  
Some states supply race-specific UFR data, particularly Southern states, but 
others do not.  1937-2002: Data are from National Center for Health Statistics, 
Vital Statistics of the United States, Natality [annual],   NCHS collected the data 
from birth certificate records, using either a 50% or 100% sample in each state.  
However, not all states ask about marital status on the birth certificate, and the 
number of states that do falls over the time period.  With interpolation of fewer 
than 9 years in any particular state, UFRs lagged 8-34 years are available for 
calculating “effective” UFR for the following states starting in 1957: Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  In addition, effective UFRs are calculated beginning in years after 
1957 for the following states: Alabama (1961), Florida (1958), Iowa (1958), 
Louisiana (1961), Missouri (1961), Nevada (1963), North Dakota (1958), South 
Dakota (1966), Tennessee (1961), Texas (1967), West Virginia (1959).  The 
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missing early data for these states is generally due to the fact that they did not 
require birth certification until some year after 1923. 
 
